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This paper builds on the recent ASPIC+ formalism, to develop a general framework for
argumentation with preferences. We motivate a revised deﬁnition of conﬂict free sets
of arguments, adapt ASPIC+ to accommodate a broader range of instantiating logics,
and show that under some assumptions, the resulting framework satisﬁes key properties
and rationality postulates. We then show that the generalised framework accommodates
Tarskian logic instantiations extended with preferences, and then study instantiations of
the framework by classical logic approaches to argumentation. We conclude by arguing
that ASPIC+’s modelling of defeasible inference rules further testiﬁes to the generality of
the framework, and then examine and counter recent critiques of Dung’s framework and
its extensions to accommodate preferences.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Argumentation is a key topic in the logical study of non-monotonic reasoning and the dialogical study of inter-agent
communication [11,45]. Argumentation is a form of reasoning that makes explicit the reasons for the conclusions that are
drawn and how conﬂicts between reasons are resolved. This provides a natural mechanism to handle inconsistent and
uncertain information and to resolve conﬂicts of opinion between intelligent agents. In logical models of non-monotonic
reasoning, the argumentation metaphor has proved to overcome some drawbacks of other formalisms. Many of these have
a mathematical nature that is remote from how people actually reason, which makes it diﬃcult to understand and trust the
behaviour of an intelligent system. The argumentation approach bridges this gap by providing logical formalisms that are
rigid enough to be formally studied and implemented, while at the same time being close enough to informal reasoning to
be understood by designers and users.
Many theoretical and practical developments build on Dung’s seminal theory of abstract argumentation [23]. A Dung
argumentation framework (AF) consists of a conﬂict-based binary attack relation C over a set of arguments A. The justiﬁed
arguments are then evaluated based on subsets of A (extensions) deﬁned under a range of semantics. The arguments in an
extension are required to not attack each other (extensions are conﬂict free), and attack any argument that in turn attacks
an argument in the extension (extensions reinstate/defend their contained arguments). Dung’s theory has been developed
in many directions, including argument game proof theories [34] to determine extension membership of a given argument.
Also, several works augment AFs with preferences and/or values [5,10,33,40], so that the conﬂict-free extensions, and so
justiﬁed arguments, are evaluated only with respect to the successful attacks (defeats), where an argument X is said to
defeat an argument Y iff X attacks Y and Y is not preferred to X .
The widespread impact of Dung’s work can partly be attributed to its level of abstraction. AFs can be instantiated by a
wide range of logical formalisms; one is free to choose a logical language L and deﬁne what constitutes an argument and
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of the theory’s justiﬁed arguments. Indeed, the inference relations of existing logics, including logic programming and var-
ious non-monotonic logics, have been given argumentation based characterisations [15,23,27]. Dung’s theory thus provides
a dialectical semantics for these logics, and the above-mentioned argument games can be viewed as alternative dialectical
proof theories for these logics. The fact that reasoning in existing non-monotonic logics can thus be characterised, testiﬁes
to the generality of the dialectical principles of attack and reinstatement; principles that are also both intuitive and familiar
in human modes of reasoning, debate and dialogue. Argumentation theory thus provides a characterisation of both human
and logic-based reasoning in the presence of uncertainty and conﬂict, through the abstract dialectical modelling of the pro-
cess whereby arguments can be moved to attack and reinstate/defend other arguments. The theory’s value can therefore in
large part be attributed to its explanatory potential for making non-monotonic reasoning processes inspectable and readily
understandable for human users, and its underpinning of dialogical and more general communicative interactions that may
involve heterogeneous (human and software) agents reasoning in the presence of uncertainty and conﬂict.
More recently, the ASPIC framework [18] was developed in response to the fact that the abstract nature of Dung’s
theory gives no guidance as to what kinds of instantiations satisfy intuitively rational properties. ASPIC was not designed
from scratch but was meant to integrate, generalise and further develop existing work on structured argumentation, partly
originating from before Dung’s paper (e.g. [37,46,38,15,44]). ASPIC adopts an intermediate level of abstraction between
Dung’s fully abstract level and concrete instantiating logics, by making some minimal assumptions on the nature of the
logical language and the inference rules, and then providing abstract accounts of the structure of arguments, the nature of
attack, and the use of preferences. [18] then formulated consistency and closure postulates that cannot be formulated at the
abstract level, and showed these postulates to hold for a special case of ASPIC; one in which preferences were not accounted
for. In [40], ASPIC+ then generalised ASPIC to accommodate a broader range of instantiations (including assumption-based
argumentation [15] and systems using argument schemes), and showed that under some assumptions, the postulates were
satisﬁed when applying preferences. [47] subsequently showed that the Carneades system [25] is an instance of ASPIC+
with no defeat cycles.
In this paper we build on and modify [40]’s ASPIC+ framework, to develop a more general structured framework for
argumentation with preferences. We make three main contributions. We ﬁrst motivate a revised deﬁnition of conﬂict free
sets of arguments for ASPIC+, adapt ASPIC+ to accommodate a broader range of instantiating logics, and show that the
resulting framework satisﬁes the key properties and postulates in [23] and [18]. Second, we formalise instantiation of
the new framework by Tarskian (and in particular classical) logics extended with preferences, and demonstrate that such
instantiations satisfy [18]’s rationality postulates. Third, we examine and counter recent critiques of Dung’s framework and
its extensions to accommodate preferences.1
With regard to the ﬁrst contribution, Section 2 presents the conceptual foundations for our framework in the context
of the above value proposition of argumentation as providing a bridging role between formal logic and human modes of
reasoning. Speciﬁcally, we: (i) posit criteria for deﬁning attack relations, given their dual role in declaratively denoting the
mutual incompatibility of the information contained in the attacking arguments, and their dialectical use; (ii) motivate the
distinction between preference dependent and preference independent attacks, where only the former’s use in a dialectical
context (as defeats) should be contingent upon preferences; (iii) argue that unlike current approaches [5,10,33], including
[40]’s ASPIC+, it is conceptually more intuitive to deﬁne conﬂict-free sets in terms of those that do not contain attacking
arguments, so that defeats are only deployed dialectically. Section 3 then revisits and generalises [40]’s ASPIC+ framework
in light of Section 2’s conceptual foundations. The new notion of conﬂict-free is adopted, and [40]’s ASPIC+ framework is
extended to accommodate instantiation by arguments with consistent premises, thus generalising the framework to accom-
modate a broader range of instantiations. Section 4 then presents key technical results. We show that Section 3’s revised
and generalised ASPIC+ satisﬁes properties of Dung’s theory and [18]’s rationality postulates.
Section 5 then presents the second main contribution, so testifying to the generality of the framework proposed here.
To start with, we generalise results of [40], in which preferences deﬁned over arguments on the basis of preorderings over
arguments’ constituent rules and premises, are shown to satisfy properties that ensure satisfaction of rationality postulates.
In this paper we show that these properties are also satisﬁed by other ways of deﬁning preferences, and furthermore address
some limitations of [40]’s way of deﬁning preferences. We then relate our work to Amgoud & Besnard’s [2,3] recent ‘abstract
logic’ approach to argumentation, which considers instantiations of Dung’s framework by Tarskian logics. We combine this
approach with the ASPIC+ framework, and then extend [2,3]’s abstract logic approach with preferences, and also combine
this extension with ASPIC+. Given Section 4’s results, these combinations imply that we are the ﬁrst to show satisfaction
of [18]’s rationality postulates for Tarskian logic instantiations with and without preferences. Following this, we reconstruct
classical logic approaches to argumentation [12,13,26], including those that additionally accommodate preferences [5]. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to prove [18]’s postulates for classical logic approaches with preferences. Finally,
we show a correspondence between a particular classical logic instantiation of Section 3’s ASPIC+ framework and Brewka’s
preferred subtheories [16].
1 The current paper extends [36] in which the revised deﬁnition of conﬂict free sets is ﬁrst proposed, and ASPIC+ is adapted to accommodate classical
logic instantiations.
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ASPIC+ with the abstract logic proposal for structured argumentation, and argue that the latter only applies to deductive
(e.g., classical logic) approaches, and not to mixed deductive and defeasible argumentation which requires modelling of
defeasible inference rules. We also argue that inclusion of defeasible inference rules in models of argumentation is required
if argumentation is to bridge the gap between formalisms and human reasoning, as defeasible reasons are an essential
ingredient of human reasoning. Section 6 also counters a number of recent criticisms of Dung’s abstract approach, as well
as critiques of Dung’s approach extended with preferences. We claim that a proper modelling of the use of preferences
requires making the structure of arguments explicit.
2. Logic, argumentation and preferences
2.1. Background
A Dung argumentation framework (AF) [23] is a tuple (A,C), where C ⊆A×A is a binary attack relation on the arguments
A. S ⊆A is then said to be conﬂict free iff ∀X, Y ∈ S , (X, Y ) /∈ C . The status of arguments is then evaluated as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. Let (A,C) be an AF. For any X ∈A, X is acceptable with respect to some S ⊆A iff ∀Y s.t. (Y , X ) ∈ C implies
∃Z ∈ S s.t. (Z , Y ) ∈ C . Let S ⊆A be conﬂict free. Then:
• S is an admissible extension iff X ∈ S implies X is acceptable w.r.t. S;
• S is a complete extension iff X ∈ S whenever X is acceptable w.r.t. S;
• S is a preferred extension iff it is a set inclusion maximal complete extension;
• S is the grounded extension iff it is the set inclusion minimal complete extension;
• S is a stable extension iff it is preferred and ∀Y /∈ S , ∃X ∈ S s.t. (X, Y ) ∈ C .
For T ∈ {complete, preferred, grounded, stable}, X is sceptically or credulously justiﬁed under the T semantics if X belongs
to all, respectively at least one, T extension.
A number of works [5,10,33] augment AFs to formalise the role of the relative strengths of arguments at the abstract
level. The basic idea in all these works is that an attack by X on Y succeeds as a defeat only if Y is not stronger than X .
For example, preference-based AFs (PAFs) [5] are tuples (A,C,), where given the preordering ⊆A×A, Y is stronger
than X iff Y is strictly preferred to X (X ≺ Y iff X  Y and Y  X ). In [33], preferences between arguments are not based
on a given preordering, but rather are themselves defeasible and possibly conﬂicting, and so are themselves the conclusions
of arguments. In [40]’s ASPIC+ framework, arguments are deﬁned by strict and defeasible rules and premises expressed in
some abstract language. Attacks between arguments are deﬁned, and a preference relation over arguments is used to derive
a defeat relation. Unlike PAFs and [10]’s value based AFs, ASPIC+’s use of preferences to deﬁne defeat takes the structure of
arguments into account.
In all the above approaches, the justiﬁed arguments are then evaluated on the basis of the derived defeat relation, rather
than the original attack relation. In other words, a conﬂict free set is one that contains no two defeating arguments, and
the defeat relation replaces the attack relation C in Deﬁnition 1.
Prior to discussing the role of, and relationship between attacks, preferences and defeats, recall that Section 1 discussed
how abstract argumentation and argument game proof theories: (a) provide dialectical semantics, respectively proof theo-
ries, for non-monotonic reasoning, where; (b) the abstract modelling of the process whereby arguments are submitted to
attack and defend, comports with intuitive human modes of reasoning and debate. Thus, the added value of argumentation
is in large part due to its potential for facilitating dynamic, interactive and heterogeneous (both automated and human)
reasoning in the presence of uncertain and conﬂicting knowledge.
It is in this context that we motivate criteria for deﬁning attack relations, the role of preferences, and a new approach
to deﬁning the extensions of a framework in terms of both defeat and attack relations. In what follows we assume that
arguments are built from strict (i.e., deductive) and defeasible inference rules (a distinction that is made more precise in
Section 3 and further discussed in Section 6), and refer to an argument’s conclusion following from its constituent premises
and rule applications (referred to collectively as the argument’s support).
2.2. The two roles of attacks
Attacks play two roles. Firstly, that X attacks Y , is an abstract, declarative representation of the mutual incompatibility
of the information contained in the attacking arguments. Secondly, the attack abstractly characterises the dialectical use of
X as a counter-argument to Y . The former role suggests a necessary condition for specifying an attack between X and Y ,
namely, that they contain mutually incompatible information. However the second role suggests that this condition is not
suﬃcient; attacks should also be deﬁned in such a way as to reﬂect their use in debate and discussion. Intuitively, if Y is
proposed as an argument, then in seeking a counter-argument to Y , one seeks to construct an argument X whose conclusion
is in conﬂict with the conclusion or some supporting element of Y . This motivates a deﬁnition of attack according to which
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concluding Tweety ﬂies, supported by the premise Tweety is a bird and the defeasible rule that birds ﬂy. Consider also argument
X concluding Tweety does not ﬂy, supported by the premise and defeasible rule Tweety is a penguin and penguins don’t ﬂy. Then
it is reasonable to say that X and Y attack each other, but if X is extended with the defeasible rule that non-ﬂying animals
do not have wings, to obtain X ′ claiming Tweety does not have wings, then X ′ should not attack Y , since its ﬁnal conclusion
does not conﬂict with any element of Y . Intuitively, X ′ would not be moved as a counter-argument to Y ; rather it is
the sub-argument X of X ′ that would be moved. An additional reason for not allowing X ′ to attack Y is that otherwise
any continuation of X (and not just X ′) with further inferences would also attack Y , which may dramatically increase the
number of attacks deﬁned by a theory (and thus the computational expense incurred in evaluating the justiﬁed arguments).
For example, if arguments can be constructed with the full power of classical logic, then this would yield an inﬁnite number
of attackers of Y .
A ﬁnal requirement for attacks is that they should only be targeted at fallible elements of an argument, i.e., only on
uncertain premises or defeasible inferences. In particular, conclusions of deductive inferences in an argument cannot be
attacked. This should be obvious since the very meaning of deductive inference is that the truth of the premises of a deduc-
tive inference guarantees the truth of its conclusion. Any disagreement with the conclusion of a deductive inference should
therefore be expressed as an attack on either uncertain premises or defeasible sub-arguments of the attacked argument.
This informal analysis is supported by recent formal results [18,26] showing that allowing attacks on deductive inferences
leads to violation of rationality postulates.
2.3. Distinguishing preference dependent and independent attacks
We now motivate the distinction between preference dependent and preference independent attacks. Firstly, note that we
assumed above that arguments have three elements: a conclusion, a set of premises, and inference steps from the premises
to the conclusion. Arguments can then in general be attacked in three ways: on their premises, on their conclusion and
on their inference steps. We also argue that in practice, preferences are often used in argumentation, so that a formal
framework that aims to bridge the gap with human modes of argumentation, should accommodate preferences as ﬁrst class
citizens, instead of implicitly encoding them by other means (such as with explicit exception or applicability predicates). We
now discuss to what extent these three types of attacks require preferences to succeed as defeats. To start with, we claim
that attacks on conclusions should be resolved with preferences, since such attacks arise because of conﬂicting reasons for
and against a conclusion. In such cases, explicit preferences are used to resolve such conﬂicts, e.g., based on rule priorities
in legal systems, orderings on desires or values in practical reasoning, or reliability orderings in epistemic reasoning. For
example, consider the above symmetrically attacking arguments X and Y respectively concluding Tweety does not ﬂy and
Tweety ﬂies. Based on the speciﬁcity principle’s prioritisation of properties of sub-classes over super-classes, one preferen-
tially concludes Tweety does not ﬂy. The use of the speciﬁcity principle can be modelled at the meta-level (i.e., meta to the
object-level logic in which arguments X and Y are constructed), as a preference for X over Y , so that X asymmetrically
defeats Y .
However, assuming suﬃcient expressive power, one could also encode this meta-level arbitration of the conﬂict in the
object level logic, as undercutting attacks on inference steps [37]. The inferential step licensed by the rule bf = birds ﬂy, is
blocked by a rule pN f that states that if the bird is a penguin, then the inferential step encoded in the rule bf , is not valid.
This suggests the use of undercut attacks on an inference step for yielding the same results as those obtained through the
use of preferences, in a way that makes the rationale for preference application more explicit. Undercuts also yield effects
that cannot be exclusively effected through preferences. Consider Pollock’s classic example [37] in which there is a red light
shining undercuts the rule if an object looks red then it is red, so blocking the inference from there is an object that looks red,
to the conclusion the object is red. Here, the undercut effectively expresses a preference for not drawing the inference over
drawing the inference; something that cannot be expressed as a preference ordering over arguments.
We conclude that when specifying an attack by Z on Y , based on Z ’s conclusion undercutting a rule in Y , the attacking
argument is ﬁrst and foremost expressing reasons for preferring not to infer Y ’s conclusion over inferring Y ’s conclusion.
Such attacks should therefore be ‘preference independent’, since qualifying the success of such an attack (as a defeat) as
being contingent on Y not being preferred to Z , would be to contradict the preference that is effectively expressed by the
attack itself. In other words, a priority relation that regards the undercut rule as of higher priority than the undercutting rule
cannot be regarded as a preference for drawing the inference over not drawing the inference, since the opposite preference
(for not drawing, over drawing, the inference) is already expressed in the undercutter. Thus, we argue for a distinction
between preference dependent and preference independent attacks, where undercuts fall into the latter category. Note that this
does not preclude that a third argument Z ′ attacks Z ’s conclusion that Y ’s conclusion should not be inferred, where Z ′ ’s
attack is preference dependent.
Finally, we claim that whether attacks on premises are preference-dependent, depends on the nature of the premise
that is attacked. Normally, preferences are needed except if the premise states some kind assumption in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, as, for example, negation as failure assumptions in logic programming. If Y makes use of a
negation as failure assumption of the form ∼ α, denoting that ‘α is not provable’, then an argument Z concluding α,
preference independent attacks Y , since the construction of Z is contingent on the non-provability of α, i.e., the absence of
an acceptable argument Y concluding α.
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To recap, attacks encode the mutual incompatibility of the information contained in the attacking and attacked argu-
ments, in a way that accounts for their dialectical use. In turn, the dialectical use of attacks as defeats may or may not be
contingent on the preferences deﬁned over the arguments.
As described in Section 2.1, existing works that account for preferences and/or values [5,10,33], including [40]’s ASPIC+
framework, deﬁne conﬂict-free and acceptable sets of arguments with respect to the defeats. However, we argue that deﬁn-
ing conﬂict free sets in terms of defeats is conceptually wrong. Since attacks indicate the mutual incompatibility of the
information contained in the attacking and attacked arguments, then intuitively one should continue to deﬁne conﬂict-free
sets in terms of those that do not contain attacking arguments. Defeats only encode the preference dependent use of attacks
in the dialectical evaluation of the acceptability of arguments. They have no bearing on whether one argument can be said
to be logically incompatible with another, but rather whether the attack can be validly employed in a dialectical setting.
In the following section, we therefore re-deﬁne [40]’s ASPIC+ notion of a conﬂict free set, as one in which no two
arguments attack rather than defeat. We then examine the implications of this in Section 4.2.
3. The ASPIC+ framework
In this section we review [40]’s ASPIC+ framework in light of the criteria and requirements enumerated in Sections 2.2
and 2.3. We also modify the framework in two ways: 1) we change the deﬁnition of conﬂict free, as proposed above; 2) we
further generalise ASPIC+ so as to capture deductive approaches to argumentation [2,3,5,13]. In addition, we simplify some
of [40]’s notations and deﬁnitions.
3.1. ASPIC+ arguments
The ASPIC+ framework deﬁnes arguments, as in [48], as inference trees formed by applying strict or defeasible inference
rules to premises that are well-formed formulae (wff) in some logical language. The distinction between two kinds of
inference rules is taken from [37,30,39,48]. Informally, if an inference rule’s antecedents are accepted, then if the rule is
strict, its consequent must be accepted no matter what, while if the rule is defeasible, its consequent must be accepted if
there are no good reasons not to accept it. Arguments can be attacked on their (non-axiom) premises and on their applications
of defeasible inference rules. Some attacks succeed as defeats, which is partly determined by preferences. The acceptability
status of arguments is then deﬁned by applying any of [23]’s semantics for abstract argumentation frameworks to the
resulting set of arguments with its defeat relation.
We emphasise that ASPIC+ is not a system but a framework for specifying systems. It deﬁnes the notion of an abstract
argumentation system (a notion adapted from [48]) as a structure consisting of a logical language L with a binary relation − ,
a naming convention n for defeasible rules and a set R consisting of two subsets Rs and Rd of strict and defeasible
inference rules. (As is usual, inference rules are deﬁned over the language L, and are not elements in the language.) ASPIC+
as a framework does not make any assumptions on how these elements are deﬁned in a given argumentation system (the
idea to abstract from the precise nature of L/R is taken from [30,48,15] while the idea to abstract from − and n is taken
from [15] and [39], respectively).
ASPIC+’s inference rules can be used in two ways: they could encode domain-speciﬁc information but they could also
express general laws of reasoning. When used in the latter way, the defeasible rules could, for example, express argument
schemes [49], while the strict rules could be determined by the choice of the logical language L: its formal semantics will
then tell which inference rules over L are valid and can therefore be added to Rs . If the strict rules are thus chosen then
they could consist, for example, of all classically valid inferences or more generally conform to any Tarskian consequence
notion (cf. [2]). Notice that inclusion of defeasible rules in ASPIC+ requires some explanation, given that much current work
formalises construction of arguments as deductive [2,3], and in particular classical [13,26] inference. We justify the need for
inclusion of defeasible inference rules in Section 6.
As just explained, the basic notion of ASPIC+ is that of an argumentation system. Arguments are then constructed with
respect to a knowledge base. Deﬁnitions of these are taken from [40] (with some modiﬁcations that will be subsequently
described).
Deﬁnition 2 (ASPIC+ argumentation system). An argumentation system is a tuple AS = (L,−,R,n) where:
• L is a logical language.
• − is a function from L to 2L , such that:
• ϕ is a contrary of ψ if ϕ ∈ ψ , ψ /∈ ϕ;
• ϕ is a contradictory of ψ (denoted by ‘ϕ = −ψ ’), if ϕ ∈ ψ , ψ ∈ ϕ;
• each ϕ ∈L has at least one contradictory.
• R=Rs ∪Rd is a set of strict (Rs) and defeasible (Rd) inference rules of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⇒ ϕ
respectively (where ϕi,ϕ are meta-variables ranging over wff in L), and Rs ∩Rd = ∅.
• n :Rd →L is a naming convention for defeasible rules.
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consistency checks in default logic. Note that we illustrate requirements for the asymmetric notion of contrary (as opposed
to the more familiar symmetric notion of contradictory associated standardly with negation) in Section 3.2. Note also that
in previous publications on ASPIC+ (including [40]) the idea of a naming convention n was instead informally introduced
when deﬁning undercutting attack (see Deﬁnition 8 below). Informally, n(r) is a wff in L which says that the defeasible
rule r ∈R is applicable.
Deﬁnition 3. For any S ⊆ L, let the closure of S under strict rules, denoted ClRs (S), be the smallest set containing S and the
consequent of any strict rule in Rs whose antecedents are in ClRs (S). Then a set S ⊆L is
• directly consistent iff ψ , ϕ ∈ S such that ψ ∈ ϕ;
• indirectly consistent iff ClRs (S) is directly consistent.
This deﬁnition is generalised from [18], in which these two notions of consistency were deﬁned for the special case
where − corresponds to negation.
Deﬁnition 4 (ASPIC+ knowledge base). A knowledge base in an argumentation system (L,−,R,n) is a set K⊆L consisting of
two disjoint subsets Kn (the axioms) and Kp (the ordinary premises).
Intuitively, the axioms are certain knowledge and thus cannot be attacked, whereas the ordinary premises are uncertain
and thus can be attacked. The distinction between ordinary premises and axiom premises is needed to capture systems like,
for instance, Pollock’s system [37], which does not allow attacks on premises, and which therefore need to be modelled
as axiom premises. In [40], the knowledge base was also assumed to have issue and assumption premises, which were
used, respectively, to prove that Carneades [25] and assumption-based argumentation [15] are special cases of ASPIC+. In
the present paper we omit issue premises for simplicity while, as further discussed below in Section 6.1, [40]’s result on
assumption-based argumentation also holds if all premises are ordinary instead of assumption premises. Furthermore, in
previous ASPIC+ publications (including [40]) we included preorderings on Rd and Kp in the deﬁnitions of argumentation
systems and knowledge bases respectively. We remove references to these preorderings in the above general deﬁnitions,
and only introduce them when they are required for deﬁning preference orderings over arguments.
Example 1. Let (L,−,R,n) be an argumentation system where:
• L is a language of propositional literals, composed from a set of propositional atoms {a,b, c, . . .} and the symbols ¬ and
∼ respectively denoting strong and weak negation (i.e., negation as failure). α is a strong literal if α is a propositional
atom or of the form ¬β where β is a propositional atom (strong negation cannot be nested). α is a wff of L, if α is a
strong literal or of the form ∼ β where β is a strong literal (weak negation cannot be nested).
• α ∈ β iff (1) α is of the form ¬β or β is of the form ¬α; or (2) β is of the form ∼ α (i.e., for any wff α, α and ¬α are
contradictories and α is a contrary of ∼ α).
• Rs = {t,q → ¬p}, Rd = {∼ s ⇒ t; r ⇒ q;a ⇒ p}.
• n(∼ s ⇒ t) = d1, n(r ⇒ q) = d2, n(a ⇒ p) = d3.
Furthermore, K is the knowledge base such that Kn = ∅ and Kp = {a, r,¬r,∼ s}.
Arguments are deﬁned below (as in [40]), together with some associated notions. Informally, for any argument A, Prem
returns all the formulae of K (premises) used to build A, Conc returns A’s conclusion, Sub returns all of A’s sub-arguments,
DefRules and StRules respectively return all defeasible and all strict rules in A, and TopRule(A) returns the last rule
applied in A.
Deﬁnition 5 (ASPIC+ arguments). An argument A on the basis of a knowledge base K in an argumentation system (L,−,R,n)
is:
1. ϕ if ϕ ∈K with: Prem(A) = {ϕ}; Conc(A) = ϕ; Sub(A) = {ϕ}; Rules(A) = ∅; TopRule(A) = undeﬁned.
2. A1, . . . , An → ψ if A1, . . . , An are arguments such that there exists a strict rule Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) → ψ in Rs .
A1, . . . , An ⇒ ψ if A1, . . . , An are arguments such that there exists a defeasible rule Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) ⇒ ψ
in Rd .
Prem(A)2 = Prem(A1)∪ · · · ∪ Prem(An),
2 Note that all premises in ASPIC+ arguments are used in deriving its conclusion, so enforcing a notion of relevance analogous to the subset minimality
condition requirement on premises in classical logic approaches to argumentation (see Section 5.2).
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Conc(A) = ψ ,
Sub(A) = Sub(A1)∪ · · · ∪ Sub(An)∪ {A}. Note that A1 . . . An are referred to as the proper sub-arguments of A.
Rules(A) = Rules(A1)∪ · · · ∪ Rules(An)∪ {Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) →/⇒ ψ}.
DefRules(A) = {r|r ∈ Rules(A), r ∈Rd}.
StRules(A) = {r|r ∈ Rules(A), r ∈Rs}.
TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) →/⇒ ψ .
Furthermore, for any argument A:
• Premn(A) = Prem(A)∩Kn and Premp(A) = Prem(A)∩Kp .
• If DefRules(A) = ∅, then LastDefRules(A) = ∅, else;
if A = A1, . . . , An ⇒ φ then LastDefRules(A) = {Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) ⇒ φ}, otherwise LastDefRules(A) =
LastDefRules(A1)∪ · · · ∪ LastDefRules(An).
• A is: strict if DefRules(A) = ∅; defeasible if DefRules(A) = ∅; ﬁrm if Prem(A) ⊆ Kn; plausible if Prem(A) ⊆ Kn;
fallible if A is plausible or defeasible; ﬁnite if Rules(A) is ﬁnite.3
Henceforth, we may employ the following notation for arguments.
Notation 2 (Notation for arguments).
1. S  ϕ may be written to denote that there exists a strict argument A such that Conc(A) = ϕ , with all premises taken
from S (i.e., Prem(A) ⊆ S).
2. Arguments may be written as lists of premises and rules separated by semi-colons, or in the case that an argument has
a top rule, we may write such an argument as the top rule with the antecedents replaced by the names of the sub-
arguments that conclude the antecedents. For example, we may write A = [s; s ⇒ r;q; r,q → ¬p] or A = [A1, A2 → ¬p],
where A1 = [s; s ⇒ r], A2 = [q].
3. Letting Γ be a set of arguments, we may as an abuse of notation write F(Γ ) to denote
⋃
A∈Γ F(A), where F ∈{Prem,Conc,Sub,Rules,TopRule,DefRules,StRules}.
Example 3. The arguments (shown in Fig. 1) deﬁned on the basis of the knowledge base and argumentation system in
Example 1 are: A′ = [a], A = [A′ ⇒ p], B1 = [∼ s], B ′1 = [B1 ⇒ t], B2 = [r], B ′2 = [B2 ⇒ q], B = [B ′1, B ′2 → ¬p], C = [¬r].
Furthermore, Prem(B) = {∼ s, r}; Conc(B) = ¬p; Sub(B) = {B1, B2, B ′1, B ′2}; TopRule(B) = t,q → ¬p;
DefRules(B) = {∼ s ⇒ t, r ⇒ q}; StRules(B) = {t,q → ¬p}.
We now adapt [40]’s above deﬁnition of an argument so as to consider a special class of arguments whose premises
are ‘c-consistent’ (for “contradictory-consistent”). We thus generalise ASPIC+ so as to accommodate deductive approaches to
argumentation [2,3,5,13] that require that the arguments deﬁned by the instantiating logic have consistent premises.
Deﬁnition 6 (c-consistent). A set S ⊆ L is c-consistent if for no ϕ it holds that S  ϕ,−ϕ . Otherwise S is c-inconsistent. We
say that S ⊆L is minimally c-inconsistent iff S is c-inconsistent and ∀S ′ ⊂ S , S ′ is c-consistent.
Note that we use the term ‘c-consistent’ to distinguish the notion of consistency in Deﬁnition 2. Also note that if S  ϕ,φ,
where φ ∈ ϕ , then S can still be c-consistent. As we will see later, such situations do not arise when capturing deductive
approaches in ASPIC+, as in these approaches there are no contraries, only contradictories.
3 As explained in [40], Deﬁnition 5 allows for arguments that are ‘backwards’ inﬁnite in that they do not ‘bottom’ out in premises from the knowledge
base.
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(L,−,R,n), is c-consistent iff Prem(A) is c-consistent.
3.2. Attacks and defeats
We now review [40]’s deﬁnition of attacks and defeats amongst arguments. An argument A attacks an argument A′ if the
conclusion of A (i.e., Conc(A)) is a contrary or contradictory of: an ordinary premise in A′; the consequent of a defeasible
rule in A′ , or; a defeasible inference step in A′ . These three kinds of attack are respectively called undermining, rebutting
and undercutting attacks.
Deﬁnition 8 (ASPIC+ attacks). A attacks B iff A undercuts, rebuts or undermines B , where:
• A undercuts argument B (on B ′) iff Conc(A) ∈ n(r) for some B ′ ∈ Sub(B) such that B ′ ’s top rule r is defeasible.
• A rebuts argument B (on B ′) iff Conc(A) ∈ ϕ for some B ′ ∈ Sub(B) of the form B ′′1, . . . , B ′′n ⇒ ϕ . In such a case A
contrary-rebuts B iff Conc(A) is a contrary of ϕ .
• Argument A undermines B (on B ′) iff Conc(A) ∈ ϕ for some B ′ = ϕ , ϕ ∈ Premp(B). In such a case A contrary-
undermines B iff Conc(A) is a contrary of ϕ .
Example 4 (Example 3 continued). For the arguments in Example 3, B rebuts A on A, C undermines B and B ′2 on B2, and
C and B2 undermine each other. The attack graph is shown in Fig. 2(a). Notice that if in addition one had the argument
D = [∼ d;∼ d ⇒ s], then D would contrary-undermine B and B ′1 on B1. Moreover, if in addition one had the argument
E = [r; r → ¬d3], then E would undercut A on A.
Note that Deﬁnition 8 complies with Section 2.2 and 2.3’s rationale for deﬁning attacks. An attack originating from an
argument A requires that its conclusion Conc(A) (and not the conclusion of any sub-argument of A) be in conﬂict with
some fallible element – i.e., some ordinary premise, or defeasible rule or conclusion of a defeasible rule – in the attacked
argument. Thus, while B2 rebut-attacks C in Example 4, the argument B , that contains B2 as a sub-argument, does not
attack C . Also, although A and B have contradictory conclusions, only B rebuts A; A does not rebut B as B ’s conclusion
is the consequent of a strict rule. [18] refers to this as a restricted rebut, and shows for a special case of ASPIC+ that if the
restriction is lifted so as to allow A to rebut B , then this could lead to violation of [18]’s rationality postulates.
Attacks can then be distinguished as to whether they are preference-dependent or preference-independent, where the
former’s success as defeats is determined by a preference ordering  on the constructed arguments. We make no assump-
tions on the properties of . In Section 5.1 we will utilise two preorderings  on defeasible rules and ′ on ordinary
premises to give example deﬁnitions of , but the deﬁnition of defeat does not rely on these preorderings. As usual:
• the strict counterpart ≺ of  is deﬁned as X ≺ Y iff X  Y and Y  X , and;
• X ≈ Y denotes that X  Y , Y  X .
Deﬁnition 9 (ASPIC+ defeats). Let A attack B on B ′ . If A undercut, contrary-rebut, or contrary-undermine attacks B on B ′
then A is said to preference-independent attack B on B ′ , otherwise A is said to preference-dependent attack B on B ′ .
Then, A defeats B iff for some B ′ either A preference-independent attacks B on B ′ , or A preference-dependent attacks B
on B ′ and A ⊀ B ′ .
A strictly defeats B iff A defeats B and B does not defeat A.
Notation 5. Henceforth, ⇀ may denote the attack relation, and ↪→ the defeat relation.
The deﬁnition of defeats complies with Section 2.3’s rationale for distinguishing between preference dependent and
preference independent attacks. Undercuts always succeed as defeats, and so are preference independent. As discussed in
Section 2.3, undercutting attacks encode an asymmetry: the use of the attacked rule named r in an argument B is contingent
on the absence of an acceptable attacking argument A with an undercutting, conclusion ¬r. The notion of a contrary relation
generalises the above cases of asymmetric preference independent attacks, providing for greater ﬂexibility in declaring
formulae ϕ and ψ incompatible, where attacks from ϕ to ψ are not undercuts but are still preference independent.4 As
discussed in Section 2.3 an example of such a cases is when ψ is a negation as failure assumption. This is illustrated in
Example 1 in which α is a contrary of ∼ α, so that an undermining attack from an argument A concluding α on an ordinary
premise ∼ α in an argument B , is preference independent.
4 Notice that in such cases it would be counter-intuitive to allow ψ to be an axiom premise or the conclusion of a strict rule. In the rest of this paper
we will therefore assume that such cases do not arise. This assumption is formalised in Deﬁnition 12.
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Example 6 (Example 4 continued). We assume that the argument ordering  is deﬁned in terms of preorderings  on
defeasible rules and ′ on ordinary premises (in ways fully speciﬁed in Section 5.1 below). Assume that r ⇒ q < a ⇒ p and
¬r <′ r; ¬a ≈′ r; ∼ s <′ ¬r. (As usual, l ≈ l′ iff l l′ and l′  l, while l < l′ iff l l′ and l′  l; likewise for ≈′ and <′ .)
Now let B ′2 ≺ A, B ≺ A (because of r ⇒ q < a ⇒ p), C ≺ B2, C ≺ B ′2, C ≺ B (because of ¬r <′ r). Then B does not defeat
A (B ↪→ A), C ↪→ B , C ↪→ B ′2 and B2 ↪→ C (the arguments and defeats are depicted in Fig. 2(b)).
Note that if one had the additional arguments D and/or E described in Example 4, then D would defeat B1 and so B ′1
and B , while E would defeat A. Note that D ⇀ B1 is preference independent since s is a contrary of ∼ s; the validity of B1,
B ′1 and B is contingent on s not being provable (i.e., there being no acceptable argument for s).
3.3. Structuring argumentation frameworks
We now deﬁne two notions of a structured argumentation framework instantiated by an argumentation theory. The ﬁrst
is deﬁned as in [40]. The second accounts for this paper’s deﬁnition of c-consistent arguments.
Deﬁnition 10 (Argumentation theory). An argumentation theory is a tuple AT = (AS,K) where AS is an argumentation system
and K is a knowledge base in AS.
Deﬁnition 11 ((c-)structured argumentation frameworks). Let AT be an argumentation theory (AS,K).
– A structured argumentation framework (SAF) deﬁned by AT , is a triple 〈A,C,〉 where A is the set of all ﬁnite arguments
constructed from K in AS (henceforth called the set of arguments on the basis of AT),  is an ordering on A, and
(X, Y ) ∈ C iff X attacks Y .
– A c-structured argumentation framework (c-SAF) deﬁned by AT , is a triple 〈A,C,〉 where A is the set of all c-consistent
ﬁnite arguments constructed from K in AS,  is an ordering on A, and (X, Y ) ∈ C iff X attacks Y .
Henceforth, we may write ‘(c-)SAF’ instead of writing ‘SAF or c-SAF’. Note that a c-SAF is a SAF in which all arguments are
required to have a c-consistent set of premises.
In [40], it is assumed that any argumentation theory satisﬁes a number of properties. We repeat these here, and add an
additional ‘c-classicality’ property for c-SAFs, in which we refer to the notion of ‘closure under strict rules’ and the notation
‘S  φ’ given in Deﬁnition 3 and Notation 2 respectively.
Deﬁnition 12 (Well deﬁned (c-)SAFs). Let AT = (AS,K) be an argumentation theory, where AS = (L,−,R,n). We say that AT
is:
• closed under contraposition iff for all S ⊆L, s ∈ S and φ, if S  φ, then S\{s} ∪ {−φ}  −s.
• closed under transposition5 iff if φ1, . . . , φn → ψ ∈Rs , then for i = 1 . . .n, φ1, φi−1,−ψ,φi+1, . . . , φn → −φi ∈Rs;
• axiom consistent iff ClRs (Kn) is consistent.• c-classical iff for any minimal c-inconsistent S ⊆ L and for any ϕ ∈ S , it holds that S \ {ϕ}  −ϕ (i.e., amongst all
arguments deﬁned there exists a strict argument with conclusion −ϕ with all premises taken from S \ {ϕ}).
• well formed if whenever ϕ is a contrary of ψ then ψ /∈Kn and ψ is not the consequent of a strict rule.6
5 The notion of closure under transposition is taken from [18].
6 This formulation repairs an error in the one of [40], which allowed for counterexamples to some results.
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under transposition, then the c-SAF is said to be well deﬁned.
If a SAF is deﬁned by an AT that is axiom consistent, well formed and closed under contraposition or closed under
transposition, then the SAF is said to be well deﬁned.
Henceforth, we will assume that any (c-)SAF is well deﬁned. The intuitions underlying the ﬁrst four properties are self-
evident. The rationale for the well-formed assumption is discussed in Section 3.2.
(c-)SAFs can now be linked to Dung frameworks. Firstly, note that as with existing approaches [5,10,33], [40]’s notion of
a conﬂict free set of arguments is deﬁned with respect to the derived defeat relation.
Deﬁnition 13 (Defeat conﬂict free for (c-)SAFs). Let 
 = 〈A,C,〉 be a (c-)SAF, and D ⊆A×A, where (X, Y ) ∈D iff X defeats
Y according to Deﬁnition 9. Then S ⊆A is defeat conﬂict free iff ∀X, Y ∈ S , (X, Y ) /∈D.
However, we have in Section 2.4 argued that conﬂict free sets should be deﬁned with respect to the attack relation, and
defeats reserved for the dialectical use of attacks:
Deﬁnition 14 (Attack conﬂict free for (c-)SAFs). Let 
 = 〈A,C,〉 be a (c-)SAF. Then S ⊆A is attack conﬂict free iff ∀X, Y ∈ S ,
(X, Y ) /∈ C .
In either case, the justiﬁed arguments are then evaluated on the basis of the extensions of a Dung framework instantiated
by the arguments and derived defeat relation:
Deﬁnition 15 (Extensions and justiﬁed arguments/conclusions of (c-)SAFs). Let 
 = 〈A,C,〉 be a (c-)SAF, and D ⊆ A × A,
where (X, Y ) ∈D iff X defeats Y . Let S ⊆A be defeat or attack conﬂict free. The extensions and justiﬁed arguments of 
 are
the extensions of the Dung framework (A,D), as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1.
For T ∈ {admissible, complete, preferred, grounded, stable}, we say that:
• ϕ is a T credulously justiﬁed conclusion of 
 iff there exists an argument A. such that Conc(A) = ϕ , and A is credu-
lously justiﬁed under the T semantics.
• ϕ is a T sceptically justiﬁed conclusion of 
 iff for every T extension E , there exists an argument A ∈ E such that
Conc(A) = ϕ .
S is a def -T extension if S is deﬁned as defeat conﬂict free, and an att-T extension if S is deﬁned as attack conﬂict free.
We now recall a deﬁnition from [40], and then in this paper we deﬁne the notion of an argument A being a strict
continuation of a set of arguments {A1, . . . , An}.
Deﬁnition 16. The set M(B) of the maximal fallible sub-arguments of B is deﬁned such that for any B ′ ∈ Sub(B), B ′ ∈ M(B)
iff:
1. B ′ ’s top rule is defeasible or B ′ is an ordinary premise, and;
2. there is no B ′′ ∈ Sub(B) s.t. B ′′ = B and B ′ ∈ Sub(B ′′), and B ′′ satisﬁes 1).
The maximal fallible sub-arguments of an argument B are those with the ‘last’ defeasible inferences in B or else (if B
is strict) they are B ’s ordinary premises. That is, they are the maximal sub-arguments of B on which B can be attacked. In
Example 3 we have that M(A) = {A}, M(B) = {B ′1, B ′2}, M(C) = {C}.
Deﬁnition 17 (Strict continuations of arguments). For any set of arguments {A1, . . . , An}, the argument A is a strict continuation
of {A1, . . . , An} iff:
– Premp(A) =⋃ni=1 Premp(Ai)
(i.e., the ordinary premises in A are exactly those in {A1, . . . , An});
– DefRules(A) =⋃ni=1 DefRules(Ai)
(i.e., the defeasible rules in A are exactly those in {A1, . . . , An});
– StRules(A) ⊇⋃ni=1 StRules(Ai) and Premn(A) ⊇
⋃n
i=1 Premn(Ai)
(i.e., the strict rules and axiom premises of A are a superset of the strict rules and axiom premises in {A1, . . . , An}).
Example 7 (Example 3 continued). In Example 3, we have that B is a strict continuation of B ′1 and B ′2. Now notice that the
argumentation theory in Example 1 is not well deﬁned, since it is neither closed under contraposition or transposition.
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Closure under transposition augments Rs with rules t, p → ¬q and p,q → ¬t , so obtaining the additional arguments A+1 =
[B ′1, A ⇒ ¬q] that rebut-attacks B ′2 (and so B), and A+2 = [A, B ′2 ⇒ ¬t] that rebut-attacks B ′1 (and so B). Fig. 3(a) shows
these additional arguments and attacks.
4. Properties and postulates
In this section we examine the implications of the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free sets. We show that under some as-
sumptions on the preference ordering over arguments, both SAFs and c-SAFs satisfy the key properties of Dung frameworks.
We also show that [18]’s rationality postulates straightforwardly hold. On the other hand, we will show that under [40]’s
‘defeat deﬁnition’ of conﬂict free, key properties of Dung frameworks straightforwardly hold, whereas satisfaction of [18]’s
rationality postulates requires assumptions on preference orderings. Note that for the defeat deﬁnition, [40] has already
shown satisfaction of the rationality postulates for SAFs. This paper extends [40]’s results to c-SAFs. Finally, we will show
equivalence of admissible and complete extensions under the attack and defeat deﬁnitions of conﬂict free.
4.1. Properties of SAFs and c-SAFs under the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free
Deﬁning conﬂict free sets in terms of the attack relation, while using the defeat relation for determining the acceptability
of arguments, potentially undermines some key results shown for Dung frameworks. To illustrate, consider Example 6’s SAF,
with the arguments and attacks shown in Fig. 2(a). As shown in Fig. 2(b), no argument defeats B , so {B} is att-admissible
(as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 15). Since B ≺ A, then B ↪→ A, and so A is acceptable w.r.t. {B}. But {A, B} is not attack conﬂict
free and so not att-admissible. This violates Dung’s fundamental lemma [23], which states that if S is admissible and A is
acceptable w.r.t. S then S ∪{A} is admissible. However, if the SAF is well deﬁned (Deﬁnition 12), then under the assumption
that an argument ordering is reasonable, we can show that the fundamental lemma holds.
An argument ordering  is reasonable if it satisﬁes properties that one might expect to hold of orderings over arguments
composed from fallible and infallible elements. Firstly, whenever an argument A is not fallible (i.e., strict and ﬁrm), then it is
strictly preferred over all arguments with fallible elements, and not less preferred than any other argument. Also, continuing
an argument with only axiom premises and strict inferences does not change its relative preference. The second property is
essentially a strengthening of the requirement that the strict counter-part ≺ of  is asymmetric, by stating that for any set
A′ = {C1, . . . ,Cn} of arguments, it cannot be that for all i, C ′ ≺ Ci where C ′ is a strict continuation of A′\Ci .
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1. (i) ∀A, B , if A is strict and ﬁrm and B is plausible or defeasible, then B ≺ A;
(ii) ∀A, B , if B is strict and ﬁrm then B ⊀ A;
(iii) ∀A, A′, B such that A′ is a strict continuation of {A}, if A ⊀ B then A′ ⊀ B , and if B ⊀ A then B ⊀ A′ (i.e., ap-
plying strict rules to a single argument’s conclusion and possibly adding new axiom premises does not weaken,
respectively strengthen, arguments).
2. Let {C1, . . . ,Cn} be a ﬁnite subset of A, and for i = 1 . . .n, let C+\i be some strict continuation of {C1, . . . ,Ci−1,
Ci+1, . . . ,Cn}. Then it is not the case that: ∀i, C+\i ≺ Ci .
In Section 5.1 we give example deﬁnitions of argument orderings in terms of preorderings on the ordinary premises
and defeasible rules, corresponding to the commonly used weakest and last link principles. We will then show that these
argument orderings are reasonable. Henceforth, we will assume that the ordering  of any (c-)SAF is reasonable.
We now examine the implications of an argument ordering being reasonable. Under the assumption that Example 6’s
SAF is well-deﬁned, we additionally have the arguments and attacks described in Example 7, and shown in Fig. 2(c). Recall
that we have the maximal fallible sub-arguments {A, B ′1, B ′2} of A and B , where:
• B is a strict continuation of {B ′1, B ′2};
• A+1 a strict continuation of {B ′1, A};
• A+2 a strict continuation of {B ′2, A}.
Assuming  is reasonable, then by Deﬁnition 18-2:
it cannot be that B ≺ A, A+1 ≺ B ′2 and A+2 ≺ B ′1.
Since by assumption B ≺ A, then it must be that either A+1 ⊀ B ′2 or A+2 ⊀ B ′1, and so A+1 defeats B ′2 or A+2 defeats B ′1.
Indeed, if we refer to the preordering over defeasible rules given in Example 6, then since no rule in B ′2 is strictly stronger
than a rule in A+1 , and no rule in B ′1 is strictly stronger than a rule in A
+
2 , then A
+
1 ⊀ B
′
2, A
+
2 ⊀ B
′
1,
7 and we obtain the
defeat graph shown in Fig. 3.
In fact, the following general result can be shown:
Proposition 8. Let A and B be arguments where B is plausible or defeasible and A and B have contradictory conclusions, and assume
Prem(A)∪Prem(B) is c-consistent if A and B are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 7, that is, if they are assumed to have c-consistent premises.
Then:
1. For all B ′ ∈ M(B), there exists a strict continuation A+B ′ of (M(B)\{B ′})∪ M(A) such that A+B ′ rebuts or undermines B on B ′ .
2. If B ≺ A, and  is reasonable, then for some B ′ ∈ M(B), A+B ′ defeats B.
This says that if the argument ordering is reasonable, then whenever an argument B with a strict top rule rebuts (but
not contrary rebuts) an argument A with a defeasible top rule but is inferior to A, we can strictly continue A into an
argument defeating B .
Let us now generalise the earlier suggested counter-example to the fundamental lemma. Assume B ∈ S , S is admissible,
and either: 1) B attacks A on A′ , B ≺ A′ , and so B does not defeat A (i.e., the example described at the beginning of this
section), or; 2) A attacks B on B ′ , A ≺ B ′ , and so A does not defeat B ′ . The proof of Proposition 10 below then makes use of
Proposition 8 to show that in neither case can A be acceptable w.r.t. S . This means that the result that if A is acceptable w.r.t.
an admissible S then S ∪{A} is conﬂict free, and hence Dung’s fundamental lemma, is not under threat. Prior to Proposition 10,
we state a key result for c-SAFs in order to show that Dung’s fundamental lemma and the rationality postulates can be
shown when arguments are restricted to those with consistent premises:
Proposition 9. Let (A, C , ) be a c-SAF. If A1, . . . , An are acceptable w.r.t. some conﬂict-free E ⊆ A, then ⋃ni=1 Prem(Ai) is c-
consistent.
Proposition 10. Let A be acceptable w.r.t. an admissible extension S of a (c-)SAF (A,C,). Then S ′ = S ∪ {A} is conﬂict free.
Proposition 10 implies that Dung’s fundamental lemma holds:
7 This is veriﬁed by the argument orderings deﬁned on the basis of the last link principle in Section 5.1.
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1. S ′ = S ∪ {A} is admissible.
2. A′ is acceptable w.r.t. S ′ .
We have shown that given reasonable argument orderings, a well deﬁned (c-)SAF satisﬁes Dung’s fundamental lemma.
This implies that the admissible extensions of a (c-)SAF form a complete partial order w.r.t. set inclusion, and that every
admissible extension is contained in a preferred extension. Also, given the deﬁnitions of defeat and acceptability, it is easy
to see (in the same way as for Dung frameworks) that if A is acceptable w.r.t. S , then A is acceptable w.r.t. any superset
of S (this result is stated as Lemma 35-1 in Appendix A). Thus, a (c-)SAF’s characteristic function is monotonic, implying
that the grounded extension can be identiﬁed by the function’s least ﬁxed point. It is also easy to see that every stable
extension is a preferred extension.
4.2. Rationality postulates for SAFs and c-SAFs under the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free
As discussed in Section 1, the intermediate level of abstraction (between concrete instantiating logics and Dung’s fully
abstract theory) adopted by ASPIC [18] and ASPIC+ [40] frameworks, allows for the formulation and evaluation of postulates
[18] whose satisfaction ensure that any concrete instantiations of the frameworks fulﬁl some rational criteria. We now show
that under the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free, well-deﬁned SAFs and c-SAFs satisfy [18]’s rationality postulates for the
complete (and so by implication the grounded, preferred and stable) semantics deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1.
Theorem 12 below states that for any argument A in a complete extension E , all sub-arguments of A are in E . Theo-
rem 13 then states that the conclusions of arguments in a complete extension are closed under strict inference (recall that
the closure ClRs (S) of S under strict rules is deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3).
Theorem 12 (Sub-argument closure). Let 
 = (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF and E an att-complete extension of 
. Then for all A ∈ E: if
A′ ∈ Sub(A) then A′ ∈ E.
Theorem 13 (Closure under strict rules). Let 
 = (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF and E an att-complete extension of 
. Then {Conc(A)|
A ∈ E} = ClRs ({Conc(A)|A ∈ E}).
Theorem 14 below, states that the conclusions of arguments in an admissible extension (and so by implication complete
extension) are mutually consistent. Theorem 15 then states the mutual consistency of the strict closure of conclusions of
arguments in a complete extension.
Theorem 14 (Direct consistency). Let 
 = (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF and E an att-admissible extension of 
. Then {Conc(A)|A ∈ E} is
consistent.
Theorem 15 (Indirect consistency). Let 
 = (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF and E an att-complete extension of 
. Then ClRs ({Conc(A)|
A ∈ E}) is consistent.
Note that the task of showing that [18]’s consistency postulates are satisﬁed is simpliﬁed by the fact that a conﬂict free
set excludes attacking arguments.
4.3. Comparison of attack and defeat deﬁnition of conﬂict free
Under the defeat deﬁnition of conﬂict free, the properties discussed in Section 4.1 are of course shown to hold for
(c-)SAFs in the same way as for Dung frameworks. We now state the equivalence of extensions of (c-)SAFs under the attack
and defeat deﬁnitions of conﬂict free.
Proposition 16. Let 
 be a (c-)SAF. For T ∈ {admissible, complete, grounded, preferred, stable}, E is an att-T extension of 
 iff E
is a def-T extension of 
.
Given the previous section’s results, Proposition 16 implies that [18]’s rationality postulates not only hold for SAFs under
the defeat deﬁnition (as already shown in [40]), but also for c-SAFs under the defeat deﬁnition.
Corollary 17. Let 
 be a (c-)SAF. Then Theorems 12–15 hold for the def-admissible and def-complete extensions of 
.
Notice that directly proving satisfaction of the consistency postulates for the defeat deﬁnition of conﬂict free is more
involved. One must rely on Proposition 8 to show that an admissible extension contains arguments that do not defeat each
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ﬁrst show that any argument acceptable w.r.t. an admissible extension is conﬂict free when included in that extension. It is
the proof of this result that crucially depends on Proposition 8. Notice that in both cases, one needs to consider the internal
structure of arguments and assume a reasonable preference ordering.
Proposition 16’s equivalence begs the question as to why one should advocate the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free.
Firstly, a result that shows that the two different notions of conﬂict-freeness are (under certain assumptions) equivalent in
the extensions they produce is theoretically valuable in itself. Apart from this, we have argued in Section 2 that the attack
deﬁnition is conceptually more well justiﬁed. In Example 6, neither B or A defeat each other, and neither B or C defeat
each other. Under the defeat deﬁnition, {B, A} and {B,C} are ‘conﬂict free’. But in what meaningful sense can these sets
be said to be conﬂict free, when they contain elements that are mutually inconsistent? Consider then [7]’s example that
purports to illustrate violation of the consistency postulates by approaches augmenting Dung frameworks with preferences.
An expert argues (A) that a given violin is a Stradivarius and therefore expensive. A three-year old child’s argument B then
states that it is not a Stradivarius. According to [7], B attacks A but A does not attack B , and A is preferred over B since the
expert is more reliable than the child. [7] observe that the unique PAF-extension {A, B} violates the consistency postulate. In
Section 6.2 we demonstrate that the problem does not arise if all arguments that can be constructed are taken into account
(the expert can use a sub-argument A′ of A that defeats B so that {A, B} is not admissible), illustrating that the problem
has more to do with imperfect reasoners. However, we also note that the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free is more tolerant
of imperfect reasoning. Without taking into account all constructible arguments, {A, B} is of course not conﬂict free and so
not a PAF-extension, and so consistency is not violated.
To conclude, given our advocacy of the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free, we henceforth assume any extension of a (c-)SAF
to be attack conﬂict free, and thus will henceforth (for a given semantics T ) refer to a ‘T extension’ rather than an ‘att-T
extension’. However, for the results shown in the next section, we will indicate, when appropriate, that the results also hold
under the defeat deﬁnition of conﬂict free.
5. Instantiating structured argumentation frameworks
We have modiﬁed ASPIC+ in two ways: we have additionally deﬁned c-SAFs whose arguments must be built on mutually
consistent premises, and motivated an alternative attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free sets. We have shown that properties and
postulates hold for well deﬁned SAFs and c-SAFs with argument preference orderings that are reasonable. In this section we
study various ways to instantiate the ASPIC+ framework. Section 5.1 consider ways of ‘instantiating’ preference orderings
over arguments in terms of preorderings over defeasible rules and ordinary premises. We show that the deﬁned argument
orderings are reasonable. In Section 5.2 we extend with preferences Amgoud & Besnard’s approach to structured argumenta-
tion [2,3] based on Tarski’s notion of an abstract logic. We then combine the extended abstract logic approach with ASPIC+ .
In Section 5.3 we deﬁne classical logic instantiations of c-SAFs, and show an equivalence between one such instantiation
and Brewka’s Preferred Subtheories [16].
5.1. Weakest and last link preference relations
In [40], a strict argument ordering ≺ is deﬁned on the basis of two preorderings  on Rd and ′ on Kp under the well
known weakest-link [16,21] and last-link [29,44] principles.8 Intuitively, B ≺ A is deﬁned by separate set comparisons of the
defeasible rules in B and A, and the ordinary premises in B and A. Then B ≺ A by the weakest link principle if:
1. from amongst all the defeasible rules in B there exists a rule which is weaker than (strictly less than according to )
all the defeasible rules in A, and
2. from amongst all the ordinary premises in B there is an ordinary premise which is weaker (strictly less than according
to ′) all the ordinary premises in A.
Then B ≺ A by the last link principle if the above set comparison (henceforth referred to as the Elitist comparison)
on defeasible rules is now applied only to the last defeasible rules in B and A (recall the deﬁnition of LastDefRules in
Deﬁnition 5); i.e., ‘all the last’ replaces ‘all the’ in 1). If there are no defeasible rules in B and A, then only the ordinary
premises are compared, and so B ≺ A by the last link principle if 2) holds.
In this paper we address two limitations of the way argument orderings are deﬁned in [40]. Firstly, in [40], strict pref-
erences over arguments (≺) are deﬁned directly, in terms of the above set comparisons. However, to comply with the
deﬁnition of the general ASPIC+framework, we now deﬁne the non-strict ordering , letting the strict counterpart ≺ be
then deﬁned in the usual way. Unlike [40], we can then identify equivalence classes of arguments under  (recall that
A ≈ B iff A  B and B  A). To directly deﬁne  under the weakest or last link principles, in turn requires that we deﬁne
non-strict set comparisons over the defeasible rules/axiom premises (in which ‘less than or equal’ replaces ‘strictly less than’
8 Note that the cited papers make use of the principles without explicitly naming them as such.
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is discussed at further length after Deﬁnition 21 below.
Finally, we broaden the range of instantiations of  considered in [40], by allowing for an alternative comparison of the
(last) defeasible rules and ordinary premises in B and A. Speciﬁcally, we provide an alternative interpretation of the weakest
and last link principles based on an alternative set comparison (sometimes referred to as the Democratic comparison
[21]). In what follows, we provide a general deﬁnition of a set comparison s that can be applied to defeasible rules and
premises, and which is then parameterised according to the Elitist and Democratic comparisons (i.e., s = Eli and
Dem respectively):
Deﬁnition 19 (Orderings s). Let Γ and Γ ′ be ﬁnite sets.9 Then s is deﬁned as follows:
1. If Γ = ∅ then Γ s Γ ′;
2. If Γ ′ = ∅ and Γ = ∅ then Γ s Γ ′;
else:
3. assuming a preordering  over the elements in Γ ∪ Γ ′ , then if s= Eli:
Γ Eli Γ ′ if ∃X ∈ Γ s.t. ∀Y ∈ Γ ′ , X  Y .
else:
4. assuming a preordering  over the elements in Γ ∪ Γ ′ , then if s= Dem:
Γ Dem Γ ′ if ∀X ∈ Γ , ∃Y ∈ Γ ′ , X  Y .
The strict counterpart of s is deﬁned in the usual way: Γ s Γ ′ iff Γ s Γ ′ and Γ ′ s Γ .
Note that for any sets of defeasible rules/ordinary premises S and S ′ , we intuitively want that:
1) if S is the empty set, it cannot be that S  S ′;
2) if S ′ is the empty set, it must be that S  S ′ for any non-empty S .
Hence the above deﬁnition explicitly imposes that any set comparison s satisﬁes these properties since one cannot assume
them to be satisﬁed for every possible s. For example, the Democratic comparison does not in general satisfy these
properties.10
Deﬁnition 20 (Last-link principle). Let s ∈ {Eli,Dem}. Then B  A under the last-link principle iff
1. LastDefRules(B)s LastDefRules(A); or
2. LastDefRules(B) = ∅, LastDefRules(A) = ∅, and Premp(B)s Premp(A).
Deﬁnition 21 (Weakest-link principle). Let s ∈ {Eli,Dem}. Then B  A under the weakest-link principle iff:
1. If both B and A are strict, then Premp(B)s Premp(A), else;
2. If both B and A are ﬁrm, then DefRules(B)s DefRules(A), else;
3. Premp(B)s Premp(A) and DefRules(B)s DefRules(A).
Notice that [40]’s deﬁnition of the weakest link principle implies an anomaly that is corrected here. [40]’s deﬁnition
(which, recall, deﬁnes ≺ directly in terms of a directly deﬁned ordering ) implies that if both B and A are strict (contain
no defeasible rules), then B ≺ A if there are ordinary premises in B that are  the ordinary premises in A. However, if both
B and A are ﬁrm (contain no ordinary premises), then it is not the case that B ≺ A if there are defeasible rules in B that
are  the defeasible rules in A. Thus there is an asymmetry in the way that premises and defeasible rules are compared. In
the above deﬁnition, the weakest link is deﬁned so that the defeasible rules and ordinary premises are treated in the same
way.
Example 18 (Example 4 continued). Given:
• r ⇒ q a ⇒ p;
• ¬r <′ r; ¬a ≈′ r; ∼ s <′ ¬r
9 Notice that it suﬃces to restrict  to ﬁnite sets since ASPIC+ arguments are deﬁned as ﬁnite (in Deﬁnition 5) and so their ordinary premises/defeasible
rules must be ﬁnite.
10 Since if S = ∅, S ′ = ∅, then trivially: ∀X ∈ S , ∃Y ∈ S ′ s.t. X  Y and it is not the case that ∀Y ∈ S ′ , ∃X ∈ S s.t. Y  X .
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LastDefRules, we have:
DR(A) = LDR(A) = {a ⇒ p}, Premp(A) = {a};
DR(A′) = LDR(A′) = ∅, Premp(A) = {a};
DR(B) = LDR(B) = {∼ s ⇒ t, r ⇒ q}, Premp(B) = {∼ s, r};
DR(B2) = LDR(B2) = ∅, Premp(B2) = {r};
DR(C) = LDR(C) = ∅, Premp(C) = {¬r}.
Then:
• LDR(B)Eli LDR(A), LDR(A)Eli LDR(B) and so B  A, A  B , hence B ≺ A under the last-link principle.
DR(B)Eli DR(A), but Premp(B)Eli Premp(A), so B  A hence B ⊀ A under the weakest-link principle.
• LDR(B)Dem LDR(A) and Premp(B)Dem Premp(A), and so B  A, hence B ⊀ A under the last or weakest-link prin-
ciple.
• Premp(C)Eli Premp(B2), Premp(B2)Eli Premp(C) and so C ≺ B2 under the last or weakest-link principle.
• Premp(C)Dem Premp(B2), Premp(B2)Dem Premp(C) so C ≺ B2 under the last or weakest-link principle.
• Premp(C)Dem Premp(A′), Premp(A′)Dem Premp(C), and so C  A′ , A′  C , hence C ≈ A′ under the last or weakest-
link principle.
A natural question to ask is whether comparisons other than Democratic or Elitist can be employed when deﬁning
s in Deﬁnition 19, so allowing reference to a larger range of comparisons s in the deﬁnitions of the last and weakest link
principles. In what follows we identify a class of such comparisons, by specifying properties that the deﬁned set ordering
s satisﬁes.
Deﬁnition 22 (Inducing reasonable orderings). s is said to reasonable inducing if:
1. s is transitive;
2. for any kr ∈ {LastDefRules,DefRules,Premp}, for all arguments B1, . . . , Bn, A such that ⋃ni=1 kr(Bi) kr(A), it
holds that:
(a) for some i = 1 . . .n, kr(Bi) kr(A); and
(b) for some i = 1 . . .n, kr(A) kr(Bi).
We now show that the last and weakest link orderings  are reasonable under the assumption of any s that is
reasonable inducing.
Proposition 19. Let  be deﬁned according to the last-link principle, based on a set comparison s that is reasonable inducing. Then
 is reasonable.
Proposition 20. Let  be deﬁned according to the weakest-link principle, based on a set comparison s that is reasonable inducing.
Then  is reasonable.
The following propositions therefore imply that the last and weakest link orderings  deﬁned in Deﬁnitions 20 and 21
are reasonable.
Proposition 21. Eli is reasonable inducing.
Proposition 22. Dem is reasonable inducing.
Finally, note that if s is transitive, then the strict counterparts ≺ of the weakest and last link orderings  are strict
partial orders:
Proposition 23. Let be deﬁned according to the last-link principle, based on a set comparisons that is transitive. Then ≺ is a strict
partial order.
Proposition 24. Let be deﬁned according to the weakest-link principle, based on a set comparisons that is transitive. Then ≺ is a
strict partial order.
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In [2,3], Amgoud & Besnard present an abstract approach to deﬁning the structure of arguments and attacks, based on
Tarski’s notion of an abstract logic.
Deﬁnition 23 (Abstract logic). An abstract logic is a pair (L,Cn), where L is a language and the consequence operator Cn is
a function from 2L to 2L satisfying the following conditions for all X ⊆L:
1. X ⊆ Cn(X).
2. Cn(Cn(X)) = Cn(X).
3. Cn(X) =⋃Y⊆ f X Cn(Y ).
4. Cn({p}) =L for some p ∈L.
5. Cn(∅) =L.
Here Y ⊆ f X means that Y is a ﬁnite subset of X . A set X ⊆ L is deﬁned as consistent if Cn(X) = L, and as inconsistent
otherwise.
Amgoud & Besnard [2] note that the following properties hold:
6. If X ⊆ X ′ then Cn(X) ⊆ Cn(X ′) (monotonicity).
7. If Cn(X) = Cn(X ′) then Cn(X ∪ Y ) = Cn(X ′ ∪ Y ).
[2] also restricts its focus to so-called adjunctive abstract logics:
8. ∀x, y ∈L such that Cn({x, y}) = Cn({x}),Cn({x, y}) = Cn({y}), ∃z such that z = x, z = y and Cn({z}) = Cn({x, y}).11
They then deﬁne arguments and various kinds of attack relations, and investigate consistency properties of various types
of attack relations when instantiating Dung’s framework with arguments and attacks. We discuss this part of their work
in Section 6. We repeat here [3]’s notion of an undermining attack.12 We also extend their approach to accommodate a
preordering over the formulae in an abstract logic theory.
Deﬁnition 24 (Arguments and attacks in abstract logics). Let (L,Cn) be an abstract logic and (Σ,) a theory in (L,Cn), where
Σ ⊆L and  a preordering over Σ :
• an AL-argument is a pair (X, p) such that: 1) X ⊆ Σ ; 2) X is consistent; 3) p ∈ Cn(X); 4) no proper subset of X
satisﬁes (1–3).
• (X, p) AL-undermines (Y ,q) if there exists a q′ ∈ Y such that {p,q′} is inconsistent.
We formally deﬁne the notion of an ASPIC+ argumentation theory based on an abstract logic with preferences. This
involves deﬁning the set of strict rules in terms of the abstract-logic’s consequence notion but also relating the − relation
to the Tarskian notion of consistency. Note that the latter does not allow for deﬁning asymmetric contrary relations, and so
we have to assume that ASPIC+’s − relation is symmetric. Next, two conditions are needed to relate the − relation to the
Tarskian notion of consistency. Firstly, if two formulae are contradictories of each other then they are jointly inconsistent.
Secondly, if two formulae are jointly inconsistent, then each of them has a consequence that is a contradictory of the other.
Also, a knowledge base will consist of the elements of an abstract logic theory as ordinary premises, while the argument
ordering will be deﬁned in terms of a preordering on the abstract logic theory. Finally, to avoid confusion we henceforth
refer to the abstract logic notion of consistency as ‘AL-consistency’.
Deﬁnition 25 (AT and c-SAF based on abstract logic with preferences). Let (L′,Cn) be an abstract logic and (Σ,′) a theory
in (L′,Cn). An abstract logic (AL) argumentation theory based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′), is a pair (AS,K) such that AS is an
argumentation system (L,−,R,n) based on (L′,Cn), where:
1. L=L′;
2. Rd = ∅, and for all ﬁnite S ⊆L and p ∈L, S → p ∈Rs iff p ∈ Cn(S);
3. − is deﬁned such that:
(a) if ϕ ∈ ψ then ψ ∈ ϕ;
(b) if ϕ ∈ ψ then {ϕ,ψ} is AL-inconsistent;
11 For example, classical logic is adjunctive because of the conjunction connective.
12 [3] call undermining “undercutting” but to be consistent with ASPIC+ ’s terminology we rename it to ‘undermining’.
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(d) ϕ is non-empty for all ϕ .
K is a knowledge base such that Kn = ∅ and Kp = Σ .
(A,C,) is the c-SAF based on (AS,K), as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 11 and where  is deﬁned in terms of ′ as in
Section 5.1. We also say that (A,C,) is the c-SAF based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′).
We can then show that a c-SAF based on an abstract logic with preferences is well deﬁned:
Proposition 25. A c-SAF based on an AL argumentation theory is closed under contraposition, axiom consistent, c-classical, and well-
formed.
Since  is reasonable, Proposition 25 implies that all the results and rationality postulates in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 hold for
c-SAFs based on an abstract logic with preferences. However, note that these c-SAFs are instantiated by ASPIC+ arguments
and undermining attacks (since rebuts and undercuts only apply to defeasible rules). The question naturally arises as to
whether they are equivalent to the AL arguments and undermining attacks in Deﬁnition 24. We ﬁrst show that the attacks
are indeed equivalent. To do so, we deﬁne the notion of an AL-c-SAF:
Deﬁnition 26. Let an ASPIC+-AL-undermining attack be deﬁned in the same way as an ASPIC+undermining attack, with
‘Conc(A)  −ϕ ’ replacing ‘Conc(A) ∈ ϕ ’ in Deﬁnition 8.
Then an AL-c-SAF deﬁned by (AS,K) is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 25, with ‘(X, Y ) ∈ C iff X ASPIC+-AL-undermines Y ’
replacing ‘(X, Y ) ∈ C iff X attacks Y ’ in Deﬁnition 11.
Given Lemma 42 in Section A.5, which shows that Conc(A)  −ϕ iff {Conc(A),ϕ} is AL-inconsistent, then the following
result shows that ASPIC+’s undermining attacks faithfully reconstruct abstract logic undermining attacks:
Proposition 26. 13 Let (AS,K) be based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′). Let
1 be the c-SAF deﬁned by (AS,K) and′ , and
2 the AL-c-SAF
deﬁned by (AS,K) and ′ . Then, for T ∈ {complete, grounded, preferred, stable}, E is a T extension of 
1 iff E is a T extension of 
2 .
Now, observe that we do not have an equivalence between ASPIC+ arguments and AL arguments, because the latter
imposes a subset minimality condition on the premises. This condition is not imposed on ASPIC+ arguments in Deﬁnition 5,
and neither is it implied by the deﬁnition of Rs in Deﬁnition 25. Consider the following counter-example. Given q ∈ Cn({p}),
s ∈ Cn({p, r}) and q ∈ Cn({s}), we obtain Rs = {p → q; p, r → s; s → q}. Then we have the strict arguments {p}  q and
{p, r}  q where the latter is not subset minimal.
In general, minimality of premise sets is undesirable. Suppose a defeasible rule p ⇒ q and a strict rule p, r → q: then
we clearly do not want to rule out an argument for q with premises p and r, since it could well be stronger than the
defeasible argument. However, since the ASPIC+ arguments deﬁned by an AL argumentation theory are strict, we deﬁne
here the notion of premise minimal ASPIC+ arguments and show an equivalence with AL arguments.
Deﬁnition 27 (Premise minimal ASPIC+ arguments). Let for any argument A, A− be any argument such that Prem(A−) ⊆
Prem(A) and Conc(A−) = Conc(A). Given a set of ASPIC+ arguments A, let A− = {A ∈A | there is no A− ∈A such that
Prem(A−) ⊂ Prem(A)} be the premise minimal arguments in A.
Proposition 27. Let (AS,K) be based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′). Then A is a c-consistent premise minimal argument on the basis of
(AS,K) iff (Prem(A),Conc(A)) is an abstract logic argument on the basis of (Σ,′).
We can then show that for c-SAFs and SAFs, when restricting consideration to arguments with minimal premise sets, the
conclusions of arguments in complete extensions remains unchanged, under the assumption that an argument cannot be
strengthened by just adding premises. The latter is formulated by requiring that if B is not strictly preferred to A then B is
not strictly preferred to A− (since if B were strictly preferred to A− this would imply that A− has been strengthened by
adding premises to obtain A).
Proposition 28. Let 
 be the (c)-SAF (A,C,) deﬁned on the basis of an AT for which is deﬁned such that for any A ∈A, if A ⊀ B
then A− ⊀ B.
13 Note that in Appendix A, the proof of Proposition 26 shows that the result holds under both attack and defeat deﬁnitions of conﬂict free.
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− be the premise minimal (c)-SAF (A−,C−,−) where:
• A− is the set of premise minimal arguments inA.
• C− = {(X, Y )|(X, Y ) ∈ C, X, Y ∈A−}.
• −= {(X, Y )|(X, Y ) ∈, X, Y ∈A−}.
Then for T ∈ {complete, grounded, preferred, stable}, E is a T extension of 
 iff E ′ is a T extension of 
− , where E ′ ⊆ E and⋃
X∈E Conc(X) =
⋃
Y∈E ′ Conc(Y ).
Note that although the above proposition assumes the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free, it immediately follows from
Proposition 16 that Proposition 28 also holds if the defeat deﬁnition of conﬂict free is assumed.
Corollary 29. Given 
 and 
− as deﬁned in Proposition 28:
1. ϕ is a T credulously (sceptically) justiﬁed conclusion of 
 iff ϕ is a T credulously (sceptically) justiﬁed conclusion of 
− .
2. 
− satisﬁes the postulates closure under strict rules, direct consistency, indirect consistency and sub-argument closure.
The assumption that arguments are not strengthened by adding premises is not satisﬁed by all ways of deﬁning .
Consider a c-SAF (A,C,) deﬁned by an AL argumentation theory, where  is deﬁned on the basis of the democratic
comparison Dem , and suppose arguments A− , A and B such that Prem(A−) = {p}, Prem(A) = {p,q}, Prem(B) = {r}, and
assume the preordering on the premises is p ′ r. Then {p,q}Dem1 {r}, but {p}Dem1 {r}, and so it is easy to verify that
A ⊀ B , but A− ≺ B . However, the assumption is satisﬁed by the elitist Eli:
Proposition 30. Let (A,C,) be deﬁned by an AL argumentation theory, where is deﬁned under the weakest or last link principles,
based on the set comparisonEli . Then ∀A, B ∈A, ∀A− ∈A, if A ⊀ B then A− ⊀ B.
In conclusion:
Let 
 = (A,C,) be the c-SAF based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′),
as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 25.
We have shown that all results and rationality postulates hold for 
. We have also shown that the AL undermining attacks
and C are equivalent in the complete extensions that they generate, and the AL arguments and premise minimal ASPIC+
arguments in A are equivalent.
Furthermore, Proposition 28 and Corollary 29 then imply that:
Remark 31. 1) We have combined [2,3]’s abstract logic approach to argumentation (which assumes no preference relation
over Σ ) with the ASPIC+ framework, in that the justiﬁed conclusions of a Dung framework instantiated by AL arguments
and AL undermining attacks, are exactly those of 
. We have also shown that Section 4.2’s rationality postulates hold for
Amgoud & Besnard’s approach.
2) Given that we have extended the abstract logic approach to accommodate preferences, consider a preference-based
argumentation framework (see Section 2.1) Γ = (A′,C′,′) deﬁned by (Σ,′) and (L′,Cn), where A′ and C′ are the AL
arguments and AL undermining attacks. Then, under the assumption that ′ does not strengthen arguments when adding
premises, the justiﬁed conclusions of Γ (speciﬁcally the Dung framework instantiated by arguments and defeats deﬁned
by Γ ) are exactly those of 
. This assumption is satisﬁed when deﬁning ′ under the last or weakest link principles, based
on Deﬁnition 19’s elitist set comparison that utilises the preordering ′ over formulae in Σ . We have also shown that
Section 4.2’s rationality postulates hold for Amgoud & Besnard’s approach extended with preferences.
We conclude by observing that Amgoud & Besnard investigate the consistency of extensions of a Dung framework in-
stantiated by the arguments and attacks deﬁned by an abstract logic. Speciﬁcally, they consider whether for any extension
the union of the premises of the extension’s arguments is AL consistent. We now show that for a c-SAF based on an abstract
logic this is equivalent to indirect consistency, and then refer to this result in Section 6 in which we compare ASPIC+ and
the abstract logic approach.
Proposition 32. Let
 be the c-SAF based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′). Then for any complete extension E of
: S = {φ|φ ∈ Prem(A), A ∈
E} is AL-inconsistent iff S ′ = ClRs ({Conc(A)|A ∈ E}) is inconsistent.
5.3. Classical logic instances of the ASPIC+ framework
The previous section’s results allow us to reconstruct classical logic approaches to argumentation as a special case of
ASPIC+ , and in so doing extend these approaches with preferences. We also prove a relation with Brewka’s preferred sub-
theories.
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5.3.1. Deﬁning classical logic instantiations of ASPIC+
Much recent work on structured argumentation formalises arguments as minimal classical consequences from consistent
and ﬁnite premise sets in standard propositional or ﬁrst-order logic [5,12,13,26]. Since classical logic can be speciﬁed as
a Tarskian abstract logic (L′,Cn), where L′ is a standard propositional or ﬁrst-order language and Cn the classical conse-
quence relation, a classical argumentation theory and its c-SAF based on (L′,Cn) and an ordered theory (Σ,′), is deﬁned as
in Deﬁnition 25. The ordering ′ on Σ and thus the ordinary premises, allows us to reconstruct classical logic approaches
that additionally consider preferences (e.g., [5]). It is then easy to verify that if − is deﬁned as classical negation, then all
four conditions in Deﬁnition 25-(3) are satisﬁed.
Amongst the above-cited works on classical argumentation, [5] and [26] adopt a Dung-style semantics, where only
[5] considers preferences. Let us ﬁrst consider [26]. They deﬁne seven alternative notions of attack and investigate their
properties, including the rationality postulates of [18] studied in this paper. They show that the only two attack relations
that are ‘well behaved’, in the sense that they satisfy consistency postulate for all the semantics, are the so-called ‘direct
undercuts’ and ‘direct defeaters’:
• Y directly undercuts X if Conc(Y ) ≡ ¬p for some p ∈ Prem(X).
• Y directly defeats X if Conc(Y ) c ¬p for some p ∈ Prem(X).
Although our undermining attacks are not among [26]’s seven notions of attack, it can be shown that our undermining
attacks are equivalent to their direct undercuts and defeats in that the complete extensions generated are the same. For
direct defeats, this result is shown by Proposition 26. For direct undercuts, it suﬃces to adapt the proof of Proposition 26,
showing that: (1) if Y undermines X , then letting Conc(Y ) = q, by the symmetry of classical negation q = ¬p for some
p ∈ Prem(X) and so Conc(Y )) ≡ ¬p; (2) if Y directly undercuts X then Y directly defeats X , and so as already shown, Y
undermines X . These equivalences and [26]’s negative results for their remaining ﬁve notions of attack justify why ASPIC+
does not model these ﬁve notions.
It follows from the above, and the results and discussion in Section 5.2, that we have reconstructed and extended
with preferences, [26]’s variants with direct undercut and direct defeat, and shown that [18]’s postulates are satisﬁed for
classical logic approaches with preferences (recall that [26]’s other variants violate the consistency postulate even without
preferences).
Example 33. Let the ordinary premises be the set Σ = {x,¬y, x ⊃ y} (⊃ denotes material implication) and assume x >′
¬y, x>′ x⊃ y. The attack graphs is shown in Fig. 4(a). Under either the weakest or last link principles, and assuming either
the elitist or democratic comparisons, A5 ≺ A1 and so A5 does not defeat A1. Note also that A5 attacks A4 on A1, and so
A5 does not defeat A4. The defeat graph is shown in Fig. 4(b).
We obtain E ′1 = {A1, A4, A2} and E2 = {A1, A6, A3}, where by satisfaction of the closure under strict rules postulate,
E1 = E ′1 extended with arguments concluding classical consequences of {x,¬y, x¬y} is a preferred/stable extension, and
E2 = E ′2 extended with arguments concluding classical consequences of {x, y, x⊃ y} is a preferred/stable extension.
The above example shows how preferences arbitrate in favour of the sceptically justiﬁed conclusion x over ¬x. Indeed,
we argue that extending classical logic approaches with preferences is of particular importance, given that (as shown in
[20,26]) the preferred/stable extensions generated from a Dung framework instantiated by arguments and direct undercuts
or defeats, simply correspond to the maximal consistent subsets of the theory Σ from which the arguments are deﬁned.14
Intuitively, one would expect this correspondence given that classical logic does not provide any logical machinery for
14 In the sense that the union of formulae in the supports of arguments in each preferred/stable extension is a maximal consistent subset of Σ .
S. Modgil, H. Prakken / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 195 (2013) 361–397 381arbitrating conﬂicts (in contrast with the use of undercuts and negation as failure in non-monotonic logics (as discussed in
Sections 2.3 and 3.2). One must therefore resort to some meta-logical mechanism, such as preferences, if argumentation is
to be usefully deployed in resolving inconsistencies in a classical-logic setting.
We conclude by noting that [5] make use of preferences to determine the success of two of [26]’s variants of attack, and
show that this leads to violation of the consistency postulates. We will discuss this in detail in Section 6.
5.3.2. Brewka’s preferred subtheories as an instance of the ASPIC+ framework
Brewka’s preferred subtheories [16] models the use of an ordering over a classical propositional or ﬁrst-order theory Γ ,
in order to resolve inconsistencies. It has therefore been used to both formalise default reasoning and belief revision [17].
Deﬁnition 28. A default theory Γ is a tuple (Γ1, . . . ,Γn), where each Γi is a set of formulae in a classical ﬁrst-order
language L′ . A preferred subtheory is a set Σ = Σ1 ∪ · · · ∪Σn such that for i = 1 . . .n, Σ1 ∪ · · · ∪Σi is a maximal (under set
inclusion) consistent subset of Γ1, . . . , Γi .
Intuitively, a preferred subtheory is obtained by taking a maximal under set inclusion consistent subset of Γ1, extending
this with a maximal consistent subset of Γ2, extending this with a maximal consistent subset of Γ3, and so on. We can
reconstruct preferred subtheories as an instance of the ASPIC+ framework.
Deﬁnition 29. Let Γ be a default theory (Γ1, . . . ,Γn), and ∀α,β ∈ Γ , (α,β) ∈′ iff α ∈ Γi, β ∈ Γ j , i  j. Let 
 be the c-SAF
(A,C,) based on (L′,Cn) and (Γ,′) as described in Section 5.3.1 (with Γ replacing Σ ), and where  is deﬁned under
the weakest or last link principle, and on the basis of the Eli set comparison. We say that 
 is the c-SAF corresponding
to Γ .
Theorem 34. Let (A,C,) be a c-SAF corresponding to a default theory Γ , and for any Σ ⊆ Γ , let Args(Σ) ⊆A be the set of all
arguments with premises taken from Σ . Then:
1) If Σ is a preferred subtheory of Γ , then Args(Σ) is a stable extension of (A,C,).
2) If E is a stable extension of (A,C,), then⋃A∈E Prem(A) is a preferred subtheory of Γ .
Note that although the above theorem assumes the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free, it immediately follows from Propo-
sition 16 that Theorem 34 holds if the defeat deﬁnition of conﬂict free is assumed. Finally, also note that the above theorem
paves the way for applying argument-game proof theories and labelling algorithms for the stable semantics [34], to pre-
ferred subtheories, as well as studying the preferred subtheories approach under the full range of semantics deﬁned for
Dung frameworks.
6. A discussion of some related work
6.1. Comparison with general frameworks for argumentation
In this section we compare ASPIC+ to related work. To start with, the inclusion of defeasible rules in ASPIC+ requires
some explanation, given that much current work formalises the construction of arguments as deductive [2,3], and in partic-
ular classical [13,26] inference. These approaches regard argumentation-based inference as a form of inconsistency handling
in deductive logic; the supposed advantage being that the logic of deductive inference is well-understood [13, p. 16]. This
raises the question of whether defeasible inference rules are needed at all. Our answer is that the research history in our
ﬁeld shows that at best only part of argumentation can be formalised as inconsistency handling in deductive logic. To start
with, the distinction between strict and defeasible inference rules has a long history in AI research on argumentation [30,
31,37–39,44,46,48], so a truly general framework for structured argumentation must include this distinction. Pollock in par-
ticular provides philosophical arguments that appeal to epistemological accounts of human reasoning, so that the modelling
of defeasible rules is a particularly salient requirement in light of the bridging role (discussed in Sections 1 and 2) that
argumentation plays between human and formal logic-based models of reasoning.
Moreover, conceptually, defeasible reasoning is not about handling inconsistent information but about making deduc-
tively unsound but still rational ‘jumps’ to conclusions on the basis of consistent but deductively inconclusive information.
Consider the following well-known example, with the given information that quakers are normally paciﬁsts, that republi-
cans are normally not paciﬁsts and that Richard Nixon was both a quaker and a republican. A defeasible reasoner is then
interested in what can be concluded about whether Nixon was a paciﬁst while consistently accepting all the given informa-
tion. The reason that they are jointly consistent is that ‘If q then normally p’ and ‘q’ does not deductively imply p since
things could be abnormal: Nixon could be an abnormal quaker (or republican). A defeasible reasoner therefore does not
want to reject any of the above statements, but rather wants to assume whenever possible that things are normal, in order
to jump to conclusions about Nixon in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In other words, defeasible reasoning is
not about inconsistency handling but about making uncertain inferences from consistent (though deductively inconclusive)
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the literature on non-monotonic logic suggests that such attempts15 are prone to validating counterintuitive inferences (see
e.g. [17,24] or [42] for a recent discussion in the context of argumentation). We therefore conclude that, given the re-
search literature, it makes sense to include defeasible inferences in models of argumentation, and therefore any account of
argumentation that claims to be general should leave room for them.
A number of works have been proposed as general approaches to argumentation. A well-known and established frame-
work is that of assumption-based argumentation (ABA) [15], which has made a substantial contribution to our understanding
of argumentation, and is shown (in [40]) to be a special case of the ASPIC+ framework in which arguments are built from
assumption premises and strict inference rules only and in which all arguments are equally strong. As mentioned earlier,
when commenting on Deﬁnition 4, [40]’s result on the relation between ASPIC+ and ABA also holds if all ABA assumptions
are translated as ASPIC+’s ordinary premises. To see why, ﬁrstly, note that ABA does not accommodate preferences over as-
sumptions. Hence all undermining attacks on assumption premises are preference independent. Since the reconstruction of
ABA does not accommodate preferences, then undermining attacks on ABA assumptions modelled in this paper as ordinary
premises, also always succeed as defeats. One can thus straightforwardly replace [40]’s assumption premises with ordinary
premises, and show (as in [40]) that ABA can be faithfully reconstructed in this paper’s formalisation of ASPIC+. Our work
is relevant for ABA, since ABA does not in general satisfy [18]’s consistency postulates.16 A simple counterexample is an
ABA deductive system with two rules → p and → ¬p. Note that is not to suggest that ABA is ﬂawed; rather, we provide
conditions (e.g. that rules be closed under transposition) under which ABA satisﬁes [18]’s consistency postulates.
More recently, Amgoud & Besnard [2,3] proposed the abstract-logic approach (AL) to deﬁning structured argumentation.
ASPIC+ is considerably more complex than AL: ﬁrstly because ASPIC+ models the use of preferences to resolve attacks, so
it has to distinguish between attack and defeat, and secondly because ASPIC+ combines deductive and defeasible argumen-
tation, which means that not only the premises, but also the defeasible inferences of an argument can be attacked. This
requires that the arguments’ structure be made explicit in order to know which parts of an argument can be attacked. By
contrast, if all inferences are certain, then arguments can only be attacked on their premises so their internal structure is
irrelevant for their evaluation. In Section 5.2 we straightforwardly extended AL with preferences and then combined the
extended AL with ASPIC+. However, AL cannot accommodate defeasible inferential rules. This is because the inferential
reasoning from premises to conclusion is not rendered explicit, but rather is encoded in AL’s single consequence operator,
which cannot distinguish between strict and defeasible inference rules: there is no way to distinguish p’s and S ’s for which
p ∈ Cn(S) implies that S → p should be in Rs or S ⇒ p should be in Rd . Furthermore, recall that in Section 5.2 we argued
that AL’s subset minimality condition on premises is not appropriate when accounting for defeasible inference rules.
The inappropriateness of accommodating defeasible argumentation in AL is further illustrated when considering whether
ASPIC+’s notion of an argument generates an abstract logic. If this is the case for a given instance of ASPIC+, then all of
[2,3]’s results hold for this instance. Suppose an ASPIC+ AT and Cn deﬁned as follows17:
(1) p ∈ Cn(X) iff there exists an ASPIC+ argument A, with Conc(A) = p
and Prem(A) = X .
It can be shown that conditions (1), (2) and (3) in the deﬁnition of an abstract logic (Deﬁnition 23) are satisﬁed. However (4)
is in general not satisﬁed. Consider an AT with K = {p}, Rs = ∅ and Rd = {p ⇒ q}. Also, (5) is not in general satisﬁed.
Consider any AT with K= ∅ and Rd = {⇒ p | p ∈L}.
Of course, many instances of ASPIC+ will satisfy (4) and (5), and thus generate abstract logics. But then we should
interpret [2,3]’s results, as they apply to these instances, with care. In particular, the notion of consistency of an abstract
logic behaves in an unexpected way. Recall that Amgoud & Besnard investigate whether for any Dung-extension E , the set⋃
(X,p)∈E X is AL consistent (see end of Section 5.2). Now, consider an ASPIC+ AT formalising the above Nixon example in
a language L including atoms p, r and q respectively denoting ‘Nixon is a paciﬁst’, ‘Nixon is a republican’ and ‘Nixon is a
quaker’ and a connective  for default conditionals. Informally, ϕ ψ means ‘if ϕ then normally ψ ’. Let the − relation
correspond to classical negation, Rs contain all propositionally valid inferences (including p,¬p → ϕ for any ϕ ∈ L) and
Rd contain a defeasible modus ponens scheme ϕ,ϕ  ψ ⇒ ψ . Then if K = {q, r,q  p, r  ¬p}, any Dung-extension
contains all elements of K as arguments but does not contain arguments for both p and ¬p so any such extension satisﬁes
indirect consistency (the closure under strict rules is consistent). However, in the abstract logic generated by Eq. (1), the set
{q, r,q p, r  ¬p} is AL inconsistent, since there exists an ASPIC+ argument for every ϕ by combining the defeasible
arguments for p and ¬p (even though this argument is not in any extension).
This discrepancy is caused by the fact that an abstract logic’s consequence operator cannot distinguish between strict
and defeasible inferences, and so regards a set S as inconsistent if the closure of S under both strict and defeasible rules is
directly inconsistent. But this consistency requirement is too strong, since the very idea of defeasible reasoning is that one’s
knowledge need not be closed under defeasible inference, since defeasible inference rules can be defeated even if all their
antecedents hold.
15 Including those that make use of applicability predicates to simulate the effects of priorities/preferences.
16 Just as ASPIC+does not in general satisfy [18]’s postulates, since one is free to instantiate ASPIC+in ways that are not ‘well-deﬁned’ (Deﬁnition 12).
17 Since for AL, consistency requirements on arguments are added on top of a given consequence notion Cn, we cannot incorporate consistency require-
ments into the deﬁnition of Cn, and so assume ASPIC+ without the restriction to c-consistent arguments.
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work on classical argumentation, but does not apply to mixed strict and defeasible argumentation, such as modelled in
ASPIC+ and earlier by many others. We should here emphasise our view that deductive approaches certainly do have their
place in the study and application of argumentation. However, we argue that a truly general account of argumentation
should also accommodate the use of defeasible inference rules.
Amgoud & Besnard [2,3] also use the abstract logic approach to make some informal negative claims about the suitability
of Dung-style semantics. First of all, they informally claim [3] that to satisfy the consistency postulates, an attack relation
should be valid in the sense that when two arguments have jointly AL inconsistent premises, they should attack each other.
However, this informal claim should be read with care: what they formally show is that validity is a suﬃcient condition for
consistency. Their results do not preclude “invalid” attack relations, such as undermining attacks, from satisfying consistency.
Indeed, in [40] and this paper we have identiﬁed alternative suﬃcient conditions for consistency. Furthermore, Amgoud
& Besnard themselves show that, under the assumption that a Dung framework contains all arguments that can be logically
constructed, their notion of consistency of extensions is satisﬁed assuming the AL undermining attacks in Deﬁnition 24,
which is, of course, consistent with our more general result showing that AL satisﬁes all of [18] postulates (Remark 31 and
Proposition 32 in Section 5.2). Amgoud & Besnard regard this assumption as problematic. However, we regard this not as a
problem of the attack relation, but of the reasoner: if an imperfect reasoner is modelled who cannot be relied on to produce
all relevant arguments, then perfect results cannot be expected. Furthermore, as argued in Section 2.2, requiring that attacks
be ‘valid’ goes against the dialectical role of attacks and has the computational problem in that it can give rise to inﬁnitely
many attacks.
Finally, in a recent publication [1], Amgoud claims that the ASPIC+ framework suffers from a number of weaknesses.
Space limitations preclude a detailed assessment of these claims here, suﬃce it to say that the formal results in [40] and in
this paper, contradict a number of informal claims in [1]. Furthermore, the interested reader may consult a comprehensive
rebuttal of [1]’s claims in [43].
6.2. Comparison with other works on preference-based argumentation
We now consider approaches that accommodate preferences to determine which attacks succeed as defeats. Recently,
both Kaci [28] and Amgoud & Vesic [6–9] have addressed the issue of how consistency can be ensured for instantiations
of the preference-based argumentation frameworks (PAFs) [4] reviewed in Section 2.1. They all argue that instantiations
of standard PAFs have problems with unsuccessful asymmetric attacks. [28] argues that all attacks should therefore be
symmetric. However, [2] shows that for classical argumentation this would still lead to inconsistency problems. Nevertheless,
[6,7,9] also criticise ‘standard’ PAF approaches, arguing that unsuccessful asymmetric attacks may violate consistency. As
a solution they propose that unsuccessful asymmetric attacks should result in rejection of the attacker even if it is not
attacked by any argument. However, our consistency results obviate the need for reversing unsuccessful attacks. We have
shown that by taking into account the structure of arguments, one can show that if A unsuccessfully attacks B , then either
some sub-argument of B defeats A, or under assumptions on the preference ordering, B can be continued into an argument
that defeats A, and that this result is key for showing consistency as discussed in Section 4.3.
But how do our consistency results square with [6,7,9]’s examples of inconsistent PAFs? [7] gives a semiformal example
which we described earlier in Section 4.3 (and which is also described in terms of uninstantiated abstract arguments in [9]).
Recall that an expert’s argument A, that a given violin is a Stradivarius (s) and therefore expensive (e), is asymmetrically
attacked by a child’s argument B that it is not a Stradivarius (¬s). The greater reliability of the expert’s assertion about the
violin means that A is preferred to B so that B does not defeat A. We observed that inconsistency is not violated under
this paper’s attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free, since {A, B} is not conﬂict free and so not admissible. However, even under
the defeat deﬁnition, we can see that [7]’s suggested problem arises only when failing to take into account all arguments.
Formalising the example in ASPIC+, A = [s; s ⇒ e] where s is an ordinary premise, and A′ = [s] is a sub-argument of A.
B = [¬s] where ¬s is an ordinary premise. Hence B attacks A on A′ , and the expert’s greater reliability means that A′ is
preferred to B and so B does not defeat A. However, one must also then acknowledge that A′ rebut attacks and defeats B ,
so that {A, B} is not admissible.
In [6,9], Amgoud & Vesic give a formal classical logic instantiation of a PAF that demonstrates inconsistency. The example
used is that formalised here in Example 33. However, Amgoud & Vesic state that A1 is strictly preferred to the other
arguments, all of which are equally preferred. They thus obtain the defeat graph shown in Fig. 5(a), and so the single
stable extension {A1, A2, A3, A5}, which violates consistency. The difference in outcome arises because [6]’s use of the
premise ordering to resolve attacks (which is taken from [4]), differs from our Deﬁnition 9 in which if A undermines B on
premise p, then A defeats B if A ⊀ p. However, in [6], A defeats B if A ⊀ B based on a comparison of all premises of B .
This makes a crucial difference. Since both A4 and A5 have ¬y as weakest premise, A4 and A5 are equally preferred in
[6]. However, we have that A5’s attack on A4 is on A4’s sub-argument A1, so the comparison is between A5 and A1. Now
since x >′ ¬y, we have that A1 is strictly preferred to A5, so A5 does not defeat A4, so A4 strictly defeats A5. But then a
set including {A1, A2, A3, A5} is not a stable extension, since it does not defend A5 against A4. Instead, E ′1 containing the
arguments A1, A4, and A2 is stable and satisﬁes consistency. We prefer our approach over [5,6], since we do not see why
the preference of the premise ¬y of A4, which is irrelevant to the conﬂict on the premise x, should be relevant in resolving
this conﬂict. Note here that the crucial point is that the structure of arguments and the nature of attack should be taken
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into account when applying preferences. In this case it is crucial to see that A5’s attack on A4 was a direct attack on A4’s
sub-argument A1.
The issue also arises in different ways. Consider the ASPIC+ example, with Kp = {p,q}, Kn = ∅, Rs = ∅, Rd = {p ⇒ r;q ⇒
¬r;¬r ⇒ s}. We then have the arguments and attacks in Fig. 5(d). Then, assuming p ⇒ r > q ⇒ ¬r and ¬r ⇒ s > p ⇒ r,
the argument ordering B2 ≺ A2, A2 ≺ B3 is generated by the last link principle. A PAF modelling then generates the defeat
graph in Fig. 5(e), so obtaining the single extension (in whatever semantics) {A1, B1, A2, B3}. So not only A2 but also B3
is justiﬁed. However, not only are A2 and B3 based on arguments with contradictory conclusions, but the sub-argument
closure postulate is violated; B3 is justiﬁed, but its sub-argument B2 is not. The problem arises because the PAF modelling
cannot recognise that A2 attacks B3 on its sub-argument B2, so we should compare A2 with B2, and not B3. Now since
B2 ≺ A2, then A2 defeats B3, so the single extension (in whatever semantics) is {A1, B1, A2} and we have that A2 is justiﬁed
and both B2 and B3 are overruled, as visualised in Fig. 5(e). Note that these problems are not due to the use of defeasible
rules or the last-link ordering. Consider a classical logic instantiation of ASPIC+ in which Kn = ∅, Kp = {p,q,¬p} and
q >′ ¬p >′ p. The following arguments can be constructed:
A1 = p; A2 = q, A3 = p, q → p ∧ q and B = ¬p.
Then, A1 and B attack each other and B attacks A3 (on p). Suppose arguments are compared based on the weakest link
principle, applying Section 5.1’s democratic principle to the premise sets. Then A1 ≺ B and B ≺ A3. The PAF for this example
then generates a stable extension containing A3 and B , which again violates sub-argument closure. In ASPIC+ we instead
obtain that B defeats A3 on A1, so the correct outcome is obtained.
Concluding, [6,7,9] are right that PAFs need to be repaired, but the proper repair is not to change deﬁnitions at the
abstract level but to make the structure of arguments and the nature of attack explicit. We have seen that seeming problems
with unsuccessful asymmetric attack at the abstract level disappear if the structure of arguments and the nature of attack
are speciﬁed, and that seeming violations of postulates do not occur if the success of an attack on an argument X is
based on a preference-based comparison on the sub-argument of X that is attacked. We have also seen in this paper that
there are reasonable notions of attack that result in defeat irrespective of preferences, such as ASPIC+’s undercutting and
contrary attacks. A framework that does not make the structure of arguments explicit cannot distinguish between preference
dependent and independent attacks.
Finally, note that besides reversing asymmetric attacks, Amgoud & Vesic [6–9] also propose a solution to the problem-
atic cases they identify, and that we have countered above, by using the preference ordering over arguments to deﬁne an
ordering over sets of arguments, privileging those that are conﬂict free under the attack relation. However this precludes
the dialectical use of preferences in deciding the success of attacks between individual arguments (as described in Sec-
tion 2); it is not clear how their use of preferences can be accounted for in dialogues and proof theoretic argument games.
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that consistency is satisﬁed, via a correspondence with Brewka’s preferred subtheories [16]. However, we have shown this
correspondence without reversing asymmetric attacks, or applying preferences over sets of arguments.
7. Conclusions
A newcomer to the area of abstract argumentation theory might legitimately question its added value above and beyond
the conceptual insights yielded by its uniform characterisation of the inference relations of non-monotonic formalisms.
This paper began with a response to this rhetorical question. Argumentative characterisations of inference encapsulate the
dynamic and dialectical processes of reasoning familiar in everyday debate and discourse.18 It thus serves to both bridge
formal logic and human reasoning in order that the one can inform the other, and support communicative interactions in
which heterogeneous agents jointly reason and infer in the presence of uncertainty and conﬂict. We then discussed the
declarative and procedural roles that attacks, preferences and defeats should play in the context of this value proposition,
and then reviewed and modiﬁed [40]’s ASPIC+ framework in light of this discussion. Speciﬁcally, the attack relation’s deno-
tation of the mutual incompatibility of information in arguments determines whether a given set of arguments is conﬂict
free, as distinct from their possibly preference dependent dialectical use as defeats.
ASPIC+ provides an account of argumentation that combines Dung’s argumentation theory with structured arguments,
attacks and the use of preferences. The added structure accommodates a range of concrete instantiating logics, to the extent
that one can meaningfully study satisfaction of rationality postulates. While the account retains the dialectical apparatus
of Dung’s theory, one must additionally show that ASPIC+’s intermediate level of abstraction allows for a broad range of
instantiations, if one is to continue to appeal to the above stated value proposition of argumentation. To this end, we have
argued that any general account should accommodate both the traditional use of defeasible inference rules as well as deduc-
tive approaches that essentially model non-monotonicity as inconsistency handling. [40]’s version of ASPIC+ reconstructed
approaches that use defeasible inference rules (e.g., [39,44]) and showed that assumption-based argumentation [15] and
systems using argument schemes can be formalised in ASPIC+. The modelling of defeasible rules inevitably introduced a
degree of complexity that exceeds that of other proposals for general frameworks. However we have argued that a truly
general framework for structured argumentation must include defeasible rules. In this paper we adapted ASPIC+ to addi-
tionally accommodate deductive approaches that require arguments to have consistent premises, and then showed that the
adapted ASPIC+, with the revised deﬁnition of conﬂict free, satisﬁes key properties of Dung frameworks and [18]’s rational-
ity postulates under some assumptions. We then formalised instantiation of the adapted ASPIC+ with Tarskian (in particular
classical) logics extended with preferences, thus demonstrating satisfaction of rationality postulates by these instantiations,
and paving the way for the study of other non-classical Tarskian approaches to argumentation. We also addressed some
limitations of the way in which argument orderings are deﬁned in [40], and considered a broader range of instantiations of
these preference orderings, showing that they satisfy assumptions required for proof of the aforementioned properties and
postulates.
Finally, a key rhetorical claim of this paper is that a proper modelling of the use of preferences requires that we take into
account the structure of arguments. We believe this claim to be supported by the results in this paper and our discussion
of recent critiques of Dung and preference-based argumentation frameworks.
We conclude by mentioning future research. Firstly, we emphasise that ASPIC+ is not a system but a framework for spec-
ifying systems, such that these systems can be analysed on their properties, for instance, on whether they satisfy the four
rationality postulates. An immediate task is to thus show how a range of systems, other than those considered here and in
[40,25], can be speciﬁed in ASPIC+. Secondly, we are currently developing a structured ASPIC+ approach to extended argu-
mentation [33], building on a preliminary such structuring in [35]. Thirdly, [19] recently proposed the additional so-called
‘non-interference’ and ‘crash resistance’ rationality postulates, which are about whether self-defeating arguments can inter-
fere with the justiﬁcation status of other arguments in undesired ways. We plan to study the conditions under which these
postulates are satisﬁed by the ASPIC+ framework (these have recently been studied [50] in the context of a simpliﬁed ver-
sion of the ASPIC framework [18]). Fourthly, we have in this paper focused on weakest and last link deﬁnitions of preference
orderings over arguments. We aim in future work to consider other ways of ranking augments, and to study whether such
preference orderings satisfy the assumptions identiﬁed in this paper for ensuring satisfaction of properties and postulates.
Finally, since many conceptual choices made in formalising ASPIC+ appeal to the use of argumentation in practice, further
real-world applications of ASPIC+ are required to establish the framework’s utility. One such existing application concerns
the use of ASPIC+ in modelling the reasoning in a well known legal case [41]. Furthermore, connections between ASPIC+
and more informal ‘human’ modes of argumentative practice need to be established. [14] represents an important ﬁrst step
in this direction, in which ASPIC+ is used to provide formal logical foundations for the Argument Interchange Format [22];
an emerging standard for representing argumentation knowledge in both computational and human centred argumentation
applications.
18 Indeed, recent empirically validated work in cognitive science and psychology claims that the cognitive capacity for human reasoning evolved primarily
in order to assess and counter the claims and arguments of interlocutors in social settings [32].
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Appendix A
A.1. Proofs for Section 4.1
Proposition 8. Let A and B be arguments where B is plausible or defeasible and A and B have contradictory conclusions, and assume
Prem(A)∪ Prem(B) is c-consistent if A and B are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 7. Then:
1. For all B ′ ∈ M(B), there exists a strict continuation A+B ′ of (M(B)\{B ′})∪ M(A) such that A+B ′ rebuts or undermines B on B ′ .
2. If B ≺ A, and  is reasonable, then for some B ′ ∈ M(B), A+B ′ defeats B.
Proof. 1) Consider ﬁrst systems closed under contraposition (Deﬁnition 12). Observe ﬁrst that Conc(M(B)) ∪ Premn(B) 
Conc(B) (i.e., one can construct a strict argument concluding Conc(B) with all premises taken from Conc(M(B)) and the
axiom premises in B). By contraposition, and since Conc(A) and Conc(B) contradict each other, we have that for any
Bi ∈ M(B): Conc(M(B) \ {Bi})∪Premn(B)∪Conc(A)  −Conc(Bi). Hence, one can construct a strict continuation A+Bi that
continues {A} ∪ M(B) \ {Bi} ∪ Premn(B) with strict rules, and that concludes −Conc(Bi).
By construction, M(B) \ {Bi} and M(A) are the maximal fallible sub-arguments of A+Bi , and Prem(A+Bi ) ⊆ Prem(A) ∪
Prem(B).
Since by construction of M(B) either Bi is an ordinary premise or ends with a defeasible inference, A
+
Bi
either under-
mines or rebuts Bi . But then A
+
Bi
also undermines or rebuts B .
For systems closed under transposition the existence of arguments A+Bi and Bi , for all Bi ∈ M(B), is proven by straight-
forward generalisation of Lemma 6 in [18]. Then the proof can be completed as above.
In the case that A and B are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 7, one only need additionally to show that Prem(A+Bi ) is c-
consistent, which follows given Prem(A+Bi ) ⊆ Prem(A)∪ Prem(B), and Prem(A)∪ Prem(B) is c-consistent by assumption.
2) By construction, each B ′continuation A+B ′ of A is a strict continuation of {A} ∪ M(B) \ {B ′} ∪ Premn(B). Hence, letting
M(B) =⋃ni=1 Bi , we have {B1, . . . , Bn, A} where each A+Bi is a strict continuation of {B1, . . . , Bi−1, Bi+1, Bn, A}. Also, B is a
strict continuation of {B1, . . . , Bn}. Since  is reasonable, then by Deﬁnition 18-(2), it cannot be that: B ≺ A and A+B1 ≺ B1
and . . . and A+Bn ≺ Bn . Since by assumption B ≺ A, then for some i, A+Bi rebuts or undermines B on Bi , A+Bi ⊀ Bi , and so A+Bi
defeats B . 
In what follows, recall Notation 5, in which X ⇀ Y denotes X attacks Y and X ↪→ Y denotes X defeats Y .
Lemma 35. Let (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF:
1. If A is acceptable w.r.t. S ⊆A then A is acceptable w.r.t. any superset of S.
2. If A ↪→ B, then A ↪→ B ′ for some B ′ ∈ Sub(B), and if A ↪→ B ′ , B ′ ∈ Sub(B), then A ↪→ B.
3. If A is acceptable w.r.t. S ⊆A, A′ ∈ Sub(A), then A′ is acceptable w.r.t. S .
Proof. Proofs of 35-1 and 35-2 are straightforward given the deﬁnitions of acceptability and defeat. For 35-3, suppose
B ↪→ A′ . By 35-2, B ↪→ A, and so ∃C ∈ S s.t. C ↪→ A. Hence A′ is acceptable w.r.t. S . 
Lemma 36. Suppose B ⇀ A, where B attacks A on A′ , and if A and B are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 7, then Prem(A) ∪ Prem(B) is
c-consistent. If B ↪→ A then either:
1. A′ ↪→ B, or;
2. For some B ′ ∈ M(B), there is a strict continuation A′+B ′ of (M(B)\{B ′})∪ M(A′) s.t. A′+B ′ ↪→ B.
Proof. Since B ↪→ A, then: B rebuts on the conclusion ϕ of A′ where A′ ’s top rule is defeasible, or B undermines the
ordinary premise A′ = ϕ , and B ≺ A′ . Also, Conc(B) must be a contradictory of ϕ since otherwise Conc(B) would be a
contrary of ϕ implying that B ↪→ A (by virtue of the preference independent attack by contraries).
Also, B must be plausible or defeasible since for B ≺ A′ to be the case, B cannot be strict and ﬁrm (under the assumption
that  is reasonable (Deﬁnition 18)).
1) If B is an ordinary premise or has a defeasible top rule, A′ ⇀ B , and since B ≺ A′ , A′ ↪→ B .
2) If B has a strict top rule, then by Proposition 8 there exists a strict continuation A′+′ s.t. A′+′ ↪→ B . B B
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must be on some Ai .
Lemma 37. Let (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF. Let A ∈A be a strict continuation of {A1, . . . , An} ⊆A, and for i = 1 . . .n, Ai is acceptable
w.r.t. E ⊆A. Then A is acceptable w.r.t. E.
Proof. Let B be any argument s.t. B ↪→ A. By Deﬁnition 8, B attacks A by undercutting or rebutting on defeasible rules in
A or undermining on an ordinary premise in A. Hence, by deﬁnition of strict continuations (Deﬁnition 17), it must be that
B ⇀ A iff B ⇀ Ai for some (possibly more than one) Ai ∈ {A1, . . . , An}. Either:
1) B undercuts or contrary rebuts/undermines some Ai , and so by Deﬁnition 9, B defeats Ai , or:
2) B does not undercut or contrary rebut/undermine some Ai . Suppose for all Ai , for all sub-arguments A′i of Ai s.t. B
rebuts or undermines Ai on A′i , B ≺ A′i . This contradicts B defeats A. Hence, for some Ai , B defeats Ai .
We have shown that if B defeats A then B defeats some Ai . By assumption of Ai acceptable w.r.t. E , ∃C ∈ E s.t. C defeats B .
Hence, A is acceptable w.r.t. E . 
For the following proposition, recall that by assumption, any c-SAF is well deﬁned and so satisﬁes c-classicality (Deﬁni-
tion 12).
Proposition 9. Let (A,C,) be a c-SAF. If A1, . . . , An are acceptable w.r.t. some conﬂict-free E ⊆ A, then ⋃ni=1 Prem(Ai) is c-
consistent.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction otherwise, and let S be any minimally c-inconsistent subset of
⋃n
i=1 Prem(Ai). By assump-
tion of c-classicality:
for all ϕ ∈ S , S \ {ϕ}  −ϕ and S \ {ϕ} is c-consistent.
We thus have the set of ordinary premises S = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} ⊆⋃ni=1 Prem(Ai) (that must be non-empty given that Kn is
c-consistent by assumption of axiom consistency (Deﬁnition 12)), such that for i = 1 . . .m, there is a strict continuation B+\i
of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕi−1,ϕi+1,ϕm} s.t. B+\i ⇀ϕi (recall that elements from K are also arguments, so this notation is well-deﬁned).
Since  is reasonable, for some i, B+\i ⊀ ϕi and so B+\i ↪→ ϕi .
Since for i = 1 . . .n, Ai is acceptable w.r.t. E , then: since ϕi ∈⋃ni=1 Prem(Ai), then by Lemma 35-3, ϕi is acceptable
w.r.t. E .
Since B+\i is a strict continuation of some subset of
⋃n
i=1 Prem(Ai), then by Lemmas 35-3 and 37, B+\i is acceptable
w.r.t. E .
But then since B+\i ↪→ ϕi , ∃X, Y ∈ E s.t. Y ↪→ B+\i , X ↪→ Y , contradicting E is conﬂict free. 
Lemma 38. Let A be acceptable w.r.t. an admissible extension S of a (c-)SAF (A,C,). Then ∀B ∈ S ∪ {A}, neither A ↪→ B or B ↪→ A.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that: 1) A ↪→ B , B ∈ S ∪ {A}. By assumption of B ’s acceptability, ∃C ∈ S s.t. C ↪→ A, and by
acceptability of A, ∃D ∈ S s.t. D ↪→ C , hence D ⇀ C , contradicting S is conﬂict free; 2) B ↪→ A, B ∈ S . By acceptability of A,
∃D ∈ S s.t. D ↪→ B , hence D ⇀ B , contradicting S is conﬂict free. 
Proposition 10. Let A be acceptable w.r.t. an admissible extension S of a (c-)SAF (A,C,). Then S ′ = S ∪ {A} is conﬂict free.
Proof. Firstly, since for any B ∈ S , B is acceptable w.r.t. S , then by Proposition 9, Prem(A)∪ Prem(B) is c-consistent.
Suppose for contradiction that S ′ is not conﬂict free. By assumption, S is conﬂict free. A cannot attack itself since A
must then defeat itself, contradicting Lemma 38. Hence, we have the following two cases:
1) ∃B ∈ S , B ⇀ A, and B ↪→ A by Lemma 38. By Lemma 36, for some sub-argument A′ of A, either:
1.1) A′ defeats B , hence (by acceptability of B) ∃C ∈ S s.t. C ↪→ A′ , and so (by Lemma 35-2) C ↪→ A, contradicting
Lemma 38, or;
1.2) ∃A′+B ′ s.t. A′+B ′ ↪→ B , hence ∃C ∈ S s.t. C ↪→ A′+B ′ . By construction of A′+B ′ and Lemma 35-2, it must be that C ↪→ Z , Z ∈
Sub(A) ∪ Sub(B). Hence (by Lemma 35-2) either C ↪→ B , contradicting S is conﬂict free, or C ↪→ A, contradicting
Lemma 38.
2) ∃B ∈ S , A ⇀ B , and A ↪→ B by Lemma 38. By Lemma 36, for some sub-argument B ′ of B , either:
2.1) B ′ defeats A, hence (by acceptability of A) ∃C ∈ S s.t. C ↪→ B ′ and so (by Lemma 35-2) C ↪→ B , hence C ⇀ B ,
contradicting S is conﬂict free, or;
388 S. Modgil, H. Prakken / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 195 (2013) 361–3972.2) ∃B ′+A′ s.t. B ′+A′ ↪→ A, hence ∃C ∈ S s.t. C ↪→ B ′+A′ . By construction of B ′+A′ , C ↪→ Z , Z ∈ Sub(A) ∪ Sub(B), leading to a
contradiction as in 1.2). 
Proposition 11. Let A, A′ be acceptable w.r.t. an admissible extension S of a (c-)SAF (A,C,). Then:
1. S ′ = S ∪ {A} is admissible.
2. A′ is acceptable w.r.t. S ′ .
Proof. 1) By Lemma 35-1, all arguments in S ′ are acceptable w.r.t. S ′ . By Proposition 10, S ′ is conﬂict free. Hence S ′ is
admissible. 2) By Lemma 35-1, A′ is acceptable w.r.t. S ′ . 
A.2. Proofs for Section 4.2
Theorem 12 (Sub-argument closure). Let 
 = (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF and E a complete extension of 
. Then for all A ∈ E: if A′ ∈
Sub(A) then A′ ∈ E.
Proof. A′ is acceptable w.r.t. E by Lemma 35-3. E ∪ {A′} is conﬂict free by Proposition 10. Hence, since E is complete,
A′ ∈ E . 
Theorem 13 (Closure under strict rules). Let 
 = (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF and E a complete extension of 
. Then {Conc(A)|A ∈ E} =
ClRs ({Conc(A)|A ∈ E}).
Proof. It suﬃces to show that any strict continuation X of {A|A ∈ E} is in E . By Lemma 37, any such X is acceptable
w.r.t. E . By Proposition 10, E ∪{X} is conﬂict free. Hence, since E is complete, X ∈ E . Note that if 
 is a c-SAF, Proposition 9
guarantees that X ’s premises are c-consistent. 
Theorem 14 (Direct consistency). Let 
 = (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF and E an admissible extension of 
. Then {Conc(A)|A ∈ E} is
consistent.
Proof. We show that if A, B ∈ E , Conc(A) ∈ Conc(B) (i.e., E is inconsistent (Deﬁnition 2)), then this leads to a contradic-
tion:
1. A is ﬁrm and strict, and:
1.1 if B is strict and ﬁrm, then this contradicts the assumption of axiom consistency (Deﬁnition 12);
1.2 if B is plausible or defeasible, and 1.2.1 B is an ordinary premise or has a defeasible top rule, then A ⇀ B , contra-
dicting E is conﬂict free, or 1.2.2 B has a strict top rule (see 3 below).
2. A is plausible or defeasible, and:
2.1 if B is strict and ﬁrm then under the well-formed assumption (Deﬁnition 12) Conc(A) cannot be a contrary of
Conc(B), and so they are a contradictory of each other, and 2.1.1 A is an ordinary premise or has a defeasible top
rule, in which case B ⇀ A, contradicting E is conﬂict free, or 2.1.2 A has a strict top rule (see 3 below);
2.2 if B is plausible or defeasible and 2.2.1 B is an ordinary premise or has a defeasible top rule then A ⇀ B , contra-
dicting E is conﬂict free, or 2.2.2 B has a strict top rule (see 3 below).
3. Each of 1.2.2, 2.1.2 and 2.2.2 describes the case where X, Y ∈ E , Conc(X) ∈ Conc(Y ), Y is defeasible or plausible and
has a strict top rule, and so by the well-formed assumption Conc(X) and Conc(Y ) must be contradictory.
In the case that 
 is a c-SAF, since X, Y ∈ E , then X, Y are acceptable w.r.t. E , and so by Proposition 9, Prem(A) ∪
Prem(B) is c-consistent.
By Proposition 8 there is a strict continuation X+Y ′ of M(Y )\{Y ′} ∪ M(X) s.t. X+Y ′ ⇀ Y . By Lemma 37 X+Y ′ is acceptable
w.r.t. E , and by Proposition 10, E ∪ {X+Y ′ } is conﬂict free, contradicting X+Y ′ ⇀ Y . 
Theorem 15 (Indirect consistency). Let 
 = (A,C,) be a (c-)SAF and E a complete extension of 
. Then ClRs ({Conc(A)|A ∈ E})
is consistent.
Proof. Follows from Theorems 13 and 14. 
A.3. Proofs for Section 4.3
Proposition 16. Let 
 be a (c-)SAF. For T ∈ {admissible, complete, grounded, preferred, stable}, E is an att-T extension of 
 iff E
is a def-T extension of 
.
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The left to right half is trivial: if no two arguments in E attack each other, then no two arguments in E defeat each other.
For the right to left half, suppose B, A ∈ E , B ⇀ A, B ↪→ A. First note that since A, B are acceptable w.r.t. E , then in the
case of a c-SAF where A and B are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 7, Prem(A) ∪ Prem(B) is c-consistent by Proposition 9. Then,
by Lemma 36, ∃A′ ∈ Sub(A) s.t. either: i) A′ ↪→ B , or ii) there is a strict continuation A′+B ′ of (M(B)\{B ′}) ∪ M(A′) s.t.
A′+B ′ ↪→ B . In case i), (by acceptability of B) ∃C ∈ E s.t. C ↪→ A′ , and so (by Lemma 35-2) C ↪→ A, contradicting E is defeat
conﬂict free. In case ii), (by acceptability of B), ∃C ∈ E s.t. C ↪→ A′+B ′ . By construction of A′+B ′ and Lemma 35-2, C ↪→ Z ,
Z ∈ Sub(A)∪ Sub(B). Hence, (by Lemma 35-2) either C ↪→ B or C ↪→ A, contradicting E is defeat conﬂict free.
Next, note that admissible and complete extensions are in Deﬁnition 1 deﬁned in terms of conﬂict-freeness and accept-
ability, where acceptability is according to Deﬁnition 15 deﬁned in terms of defeat relations between arguments. Then since
any att semantics and def semantics agree on the defeat relation between arguments, the proposition follows for admissi-
ble and complete semantics. Then since preferred and grounded semantics are deﬁned in terms of complete semantics, it
also follows for these semantics, and then since stable semantics is deﬁned in terms of preferred semantics and the defeat
relation, it also follows for stable semantics. 
A.4. Proofs for Section 5.1
In the following proofs, we may write LDR as an abbreviation for LastDefRules, and DR as an abbreviation for
DefRules. Also, as an abuse of notation we may simply write  instead of s .
Proposition 19. Let  be deﬁned according to the last-link principle, based on a set comparison s that is reasonable inducing. Then
 is reasonable.
Proof. Proof of the ﬁrst condition of reasonableness:
1-i) Assume A is strict and ﬁrm, and so LDR(A) = ∅ and Premp(A) = ∅.
– If LDR(B) = ∅, then A and B must be compared by the ﬁrst condition of Deﬁnition 20. By Deﬁnition 19, LDR(B)
LDR(A), LDR(A) LDR(B), and so B  A, A  B , and so B ≺ A.
– If LDR(B) = ∅, then A and B must be compared by the second condition of Deﬁnition 20. By assumption of B being
plausible or defeasible, Premp(B) = ∅. By Deﬁnition 19, Premp(B)  Premp(A), and Premp(A)  Premp(B), and
so B  A, A  B , and so B ≺ A.
1-ii) Assume B is strict and ﬁrm, and so LDR(B) = ∅, Premp(B) = ∅. Then by Deﬁnition 19, LDR(B)  LDR(A) and
Premp(B)  Premp(A), and so it cannot be that B  A and so B ≺ A, by the ﬁrst or second conditions of Deﬁni-
tion 20.
1-iii) Follows straightforwardly from Deﬁnition 20, given that A′ differs from A only in its strict rules and/or axiom
premises.
Proof of the second condition of reasonableness:
Suppose for contradiction that:
∀i, there is a strict continuation C+\i of {C1, . . . ,Ci−1,Ci+1, . . . ,Cn} such that C+\i ≺ Ci . i)
1) Suppose for some i = 1 . . .n, LDR(Ci) = ∅. Then, it C+\i  Ci since condition 1 of Deﬁnition 20 holds, i.e., LDR(C+\i)
LDR(Ci). Since C+\i ≺ Ci , then Ci  C+\i , and so LDR(Ci) LDR(C+\i), and so ⋃nj=1, j =i LDR(C j) LDR(Ci).
By Deﬁnition19-(1), it must be that
⋃n
j=1, j =i LDR(C j) = ∅. Let {C j, . . . ,Cm} be the subset of {C1, . . . ,Ci−1,Ci+1, . . . ,Cn}
s.t. for k = j . . .m, LDR(Ck) = ∅. Then:
m⋃
k= j
LDR(Ck) LDR(Ci). ii)
By virtue of  satisfying Deﬁnition 22-(2a) for some k = j . . .m, LDR(Ck) LDR(Ci). Then, given that by i), C+\k ≺ Ck ,
and given that LDR(Ck) = ∅, one can reason in the same way, concluding that for some l = j . . .m, l = k, LDR(Cl) LDR(Ck).
Since {Ck, . . . ,Cm} is ﬁnite, we can continue reasoning in the same way, obtaining that LDR(Ci)  · · ·  LDR(Cm) 
LDR(Ci). Then by transitivity of , for k = j . . .m, LDR(Ci) LDR(Ck). But given ii), then by virtue of  satisfying Deﬁni-
tion 22-(2b), for some k = j . . .m, LDR(Ci) LDR(Ck). Contradiction.
2) Suppose for i = 1 . . .n, LDR(Ci) = ∅. Then, given i), we can conclude (as above) that ⋃nj=1, j =i Premp(C j)Premp(Ci).
One can then reason as above (by virtue of  satisfying Deﬁnitions 22-(2a) and 22-(2b)), to conclude that Premp(Ci) 
· · · Premp(Cn) Premp(Ci), leading to a contradiction as above. 
Proposition 20. Let  be deﬁned according to the weakest-link principle, based on a set comparison s that is reasonable inducing.
Then  is reasonable.
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1-i) Assume A is strict and ﬁrm, and so LDR(A) = ∅ and Premp(A) = ∅:
– Suppose B is strict. Then by assumption, B is plausible, i.e., Premp(B) = ∅. Hence by Deﬁnition 19, Premp(B) 
Premp(A), Premp(A) Premp(B) and so by Deﬁnition 21-1), B  A, A  B , and so B ≺ A.
– Suppose B is ﬁrm. Then by assumption B is defeasible, i.e., DR(B) = ∅. Hence by Deﬁnition 19, DR(B)  DR(A),
DR(A) DR(B), and so by Deﬁnition 21-2), B  A, A  B , and so B ≺ A.
– Suppose B is defeasible and plausible. Then by Deﬁnition 19, Premp(B) Premp(A), Premp(A) Premp(B), and
DR(B) DR(A), DR(A) DR(B), and so by Deﬁnition 21-(3), B  A, A  B , and so B ≺ A.
1-ii) Assume B is strict and ﬁrm, and so LDR(B) = ∅, Premp(B) = ∅. Then by Deﬁnition 19, it cannot be that LDR(B) 
LDR(A) or Premp(B) Premp(A), and so it cannot be that B  A and so B ≺ A, by the ﬁrst, second or third condi-
tions of Deﬁnition 21.
1-iii) Follows straightforwardly from Deﬁnition 21, given that A′ differs from A only in its strict rules and/or axiom
premises.
Proof of the second condition of reasonableness for the weakest link principle:
Suppose for contradiction that:
∀i, there is a strict continuation C+\i of {C1, . . . ,Ci−1,Ci+1, . . . ,Cn} such that C+\i ≺ Ci . i)
Given 1-i) and 1-ii), at least one argument Ci must be defeasible or plausible.
1) Suppose for some i = 1 . . .n, DR(Ci) = ∅. Then, the assumed weakest link preference C+\i ≺ Ci holds on the basis of
Deﬁnition 21-2) or 21-3). One can then reason in exactly the same way as in the proof of the second condition of
reasonableness in Proposition 19 – case 1) – substituting ‘DR’ for ‘LDR’, showing that this leads to a contradiction.
2) Suppose for some i = 1 . . .n, Premp(Ci) = ∅. Then, C+\i ≺ Ci by Deﬁnition 21-1) or 21-3). One can then reason in ex-
actly the same way as in the proof of the second condition of reasonableness in Proposition 19 – case (1) – substituting
‘Premp ’ for ‘LDR’, showing that this leads to a contradiction. 
Proposition 21. Eli is reasonable inducing.
Proof. We show that Eli is transitive:
Suppose Γ Eli Γ ′ Eli Γ ′′ . By Deﬁnition 19 it must be that Γ = ∅,Γ ′ = ∅. If Γ ′′ = ∅ then Γ Eli Γ ′′ by Deﬁnition 19.
Else if Γ ′′ = ∅, ∃X ∈ Γ s.t. ∀X ′ ∈ Γ ′ , X  X ′ , and ∃X ′ ∈ Γ ′ s.t. ∀X ′′ ∈ Γ ′′ , X ′  X ′′ . Hence by transitivity of , ∃X ∈ Γ s.t.
∀X ′′ ∈ Γ ′′ , X  X ′′ , i.e., Γ Eli Γ ′′ .
We show that Eli satisﬁes the properties in Deﬁnition 22(2a) and 22(2b):
Assume
⋃n
i=1 kr(Bi)Eli kr(A).
By Deﬁnition 19, it must be that
⋃n
i=1 kr(Bi) = ∅. If kr(A) = ∅ then (1) and (2) are shown by Deﬁnition 19-2) and 19-1)
respectively.
Suppose kr(A) = ∅. By assumption:
(1) ∃Y ∈⋃ni=1 kr(Bi) s.t. ∀X ∈ kr(A), Y  X , and so for some i = 1 . . .n, Y ∈ kr(Bi), and ∀X ∈ kr(A), Y  X .
(2) Without loss of generality, let us assume:
kr(B1) = {Y1, . . . , Yn}, A = {X1, . . . , Xm}, and Y1  X1, . . . , Y1  Xm. 1)
Now, suppose for contradiction that kr(A) kr(B1) . . .kr(A) kr(Bn). Given kr(A) kr(B1), then without loss of gen-
erality, assume:
X1  Y1, . . . , X1  Yn. 2)
By assumption, kr(A)Eli
⋃n
i=1 kr(Bi); i.e., it is not the case that ∃X ∈ kr(A) s.t. ∀Y ∈
⋃n
i=1 kr(Bi), X  Y . That is:
∀X ∈ kr(A), ∃Y ∈
n⋃
i=1
kr(Bi) s.t. ¬(X  Y ). 3)
Hence, given 2), it must be that
for some Y ∈
n⋃
i=1
kr(Bi), Y /∈ kr(B1), X1  Y . 4)
But then given that we have assumed for contradiction that kr(A) kr(B1) . . .kr(A) kr(Bn), then:
∀Y ∈
n⋃
kr(Bi), ∃X ∈ kr(A), X  Y .i=1
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⋃n
i=1 kr(Bi), X1  Y ,
contradicting 4). 
Proposition 22. Dem is reasonable inducing.
Proof. We show that Dem is transitive:
Suppose Γ Dem1 Γ ′ Dem1 Γ ′′ . By Deﬁnition 19-1) it must be that Γ = ∅,Γ ′ = ∅.
If Γ ′′ = ∅ then Γ Dem Γ ′′ by Deﬁnition 19-2). Else if Γ ′′ = ∅, ∀X ∈ Γ , ∃X ′ ∈ Γ ′ s.t. X  X ′ , and ∀X ′ ∈ Γ ′ , ∃X ′′ ∈ Γ ′′ , s.t.
X ′  X ′′ . Hence, by transitivity of , ∀X ∈ Γ , ∃X ′′ ∈ Γ ′′ s.t. X  X ′′ , i.e., Γ Dem1 Γ ′′ .
We show that Dem satisﬁes the properties in Deﬁnition 22(2a) and 22(2b):
Assume
⋃n
i=1 kr(Bi)Dem kr(A). By Deﬁnition 19-1), it must be that ⋃ni=1 kr(Bi) = ∅. If kr(A) = ∅ then (1) and (2) are
shown by Deﬁnition 19-2) and 19-1) respectively.
Suppose kr(A) = ∅. By assumption:
(1) ∀Y ∈⋃ni=1 kr(Bi), ∃X ∈ kr(A), Y  X . Hence for some i = 1 . . .n, ∀Y ∈ kr(Bi), ∃X ∈ kr(A), Y  X .
(2) By assumption, kr(A)Dem
⋃n
i=1 kr(Bi); i.e., it is not the case that ∀X ∈ kr(A), ∃Y ∈
⋃n
i=1 kr(Bi), X  Y . That is:
∃X ∈ kr(A) s.t. ∀Y ∈
n⋃
i=1
kr(Bi), ¬(X  Y ). 5)
Suppose for some Bi , kr(A) kr(Bi). Then ∀X ∈ kr(A), ∃Y ∈ kr(Bi) s.t. X  Y , contradicting 5). 
Proposition 23. Let be deﬁned according to the last-link principle, based on a set comparisons that is transitive. Then ≺ is a strict
partial order.
Proof. Irreﬂexivity is immediate given that if A ≺ A, then A  A, A  A. Contradiction.
Transitivity: Suppose C ≺ B ≺ A. To show transitivity we show that C ≺ A, i.e.: 1) C  A, and 2) A  C :
1) Since C ≺ B ≺ A then C  B  A. We show that  is transitive, i.e., C  A: Consider the following two cases:
1) Suppose LDR(A) = ∅. Then B  A by condition 1 of Deﬁnition 20; i.e., LDR(B) LDR(A), and so by Deﬁnition 19-1)
it must be that LDR(B) = ∅. By the same reasoning, LDR(C)  LDR(B), and LDR(C) = ∅. By transitivity of ,
LDR(C) LDR(A) and so C  A.
2) Suppose LDR(A) = ∅.
– If LDR(C) = ∅, then LDR(C) LDR(A) by Deﬁnition 19-2), and so C  A by condition 1 of Deﬁnition 20.
– If LDR(C) = ∅ then it must be that LDR(B) = ∅ (if LDR(B) = ∅, then by Deﬁnition 19 it cannot be that LDR(C)
LDR(B), and so one could not conclude C  B by condition 1 or 2 of Deﬁnition 20). Hence B  A and C  B by
condition 2 of Deﬁnition 20. That is to say, Premp(C) Premp(B) Premp(A). By transitivity of , Premp(C)
Premp(A), and so C  A.
2) Suppose A  C . Then by transitivity, B  C , contradicting C ≺ B . 
Proposition 24. Let be deﬁned according to the weakest-link principle, based on a set comparisons that is transitive. Then ≺ is a
strict partial order.
Proof. Irreﬂexivity is immediate given that if A ≺ A, then A  A, A  A. Contradiction.
Transitivity: Suppose C ≺ B ≺ A. It suﬃces to show that  is transitive, i.e., C  A (since as in the proof of Proposition 23,
we can then show that A  C leads to a contradiction). Consider the following two cases:
1) C and B are strict. Since B is strict then A must be strict, since otherwise, B  A holds by virtue of Deﬁnition 21-(2)
or 21-(3), and so DR(B)  DR(A). But then by Deﬁnition 19-1) this cannot be the case since DR(B) = ∅. Hence
Premp(C)  Premp(B) Premp(A), and so by transitivity of , Premp(C)  Premp(A). Hence C  A by condition 1
of Deﬁnition 21.
2) C and B are ﬁrm. Since B is ﬁrm then A must be ﬁrm, since otherwise, B  A holds by virtue of Deﬁnition 21-(1)
or 21-(3), and so Premp(B)  Premp(A). But then by Deﬁnition 19-1) this cannot be the case since Premp(B) = ∅.
Hence DR(C) DR(B) DR(A), and so by transitivity of , DR(C) DR(A). Hence C  A by condition 2 of Deﬁnition 21.
3) C and B fall into neither of the above two cases. Then DR(C)  DR(B) and Premp(C)  Premp(B). Hence, by Deﬁni-
tion 19-1) it must be that DR(C) = ∅, Premp(C) = ∅.
– If DR(A) = ∅, then by Deﬁnition 19-2), DR(C)  DR(A). If DR(A) = ∅, then given B  A, DR(B)  DR(A), and so by
transitivity of , DR(C) DR(A).
– If Premp(A) = ∅, then by Deﬁnition 19-2), Premp(C) Premp(A). If Premp(A) = ∅, then given B  A, Premp(B)
Premp(A), and so by transitivity of , Premp(C) Premp(A).
Hence C  A by condition 3 of Deﬁnition 21.
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Lemma 39. Let (AS,K) be the abstract logic argumentation theory based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′). Then for all X ⊆ Σ it holds that
p ∈ Cn(X) iff X  p.
Proof. From left to right, suppose p ∈ Cn(X) for some X ⊆ Σ . By Deﬁnition 23-(3), X is ﬁnite, so X → p ∈Rs (by Deﬁni-
tion 25), so X  p (recall that X  p denotes a strict ASPIC+ argument for p based on premises X ′ ⊆ X ).
From right to left is proven by induction on the structure of arguments. Assume A = X  p, where by Deﬁnition 25,
X ⊆ Kp , X ⊆ Σ . Assume ﬁrst p ∈ X . Then p ∈ Cn(X) by Deﬁnition 23-(1). Consider next any A = A1, . . . , An → ϕ . By
inductive hypothesis, Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) ∈ Cn(X). Since Conc(A1), . . . ,Conc(An) → ϕ ∈ Rs , then by Deﬁnition 25,
ϕ ∈ Cn(⋃ni=1 Conc(Ai)). Since
⋃n
i=1 Conc(Ai) ⊆ Cn(X), then by monotonicity, ϕ ∈ Cn(Cn(X)). But then by Deﬁnition 23-(2),
ϕ ∈ Cn(X). 
Lemma 40. Let (L,Cn) be an abstract logic. For any ﬁnite S ⊆ L and any p ∈ L, if S ∪ {p} is AL inconsistent, then there exists an
s ∈ Cn(S) such that {s, p} is AL-inconsistent.
Proof. Since S is ﬁnite, we can with repeated application of the deﬁnition of adjunction conclude that there exists an s such
that Cn({s}) = Cn(S). By Deﬁnition 23-(1), s ∈ Cn({s}) and so s ∈ Cn(S). By Deﬁnition 23-(2), Cn(S ∪ {p}) = Cn({s} ∪ {p}).
Then Cn({s} ∪ {p}) =L so {s, p} is AL-inconsistent. 
Lemma 41. If X ∪ Z is AL-inconsistent and X ⊆ Cn(Y ) then Y ∪ Z is AL-inconsistent.
Proof. We prove the contraposition that if Y ∪ Z is AL-consistent and X ⊆ Cn(Y ), then X ∪ Z is AL-consistent. To prove this,
we ﬁrst show that:
If X ⊆ Cn(Y ), then Cn(X ∪ Y ) = Cn(Y ). (1)
By monotonicity, Cn(Y ) ⊆ Cn(X ∪ Y ). We prove that Cn(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ Cn(Y ). Let X ⊆ Cn(Y ). By Deﬁnition 23-(1), Y ⊆ Cn(Y ).
But then X ∪ Y ⊆ Cn(Y ). Then by monotonicity Cn(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ Cn(Cn(Y )). Since Cn(Cn(Y )) = Cn(Y ) (by Deﬁnition 23-(2)),
then Cn(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ Cn(Y ). So Cn(X ∪ Y ) = Cn(Y ).
We have shown (1). Then by property (7) in Section 5.2, Cn(X ∪ Y ∪ Z) = Cn(Y ∪ Z). Now if Cn(Y ∪ Z) = L then
Cn(X ∪ Y ∪ Z) =L. But then by monotonicity Cn(X ∪ Z) =L. 
Proposition 25. A c-SAF based on an AL argumentation theory is closed under contraposition, axiom consistent, c-classical, and well-
formed.
Proof. Well-formedness immediately follows from the fact that the − relation is symmetric. Axiom consistency follows from
the fact that Kn = ∅. To prove satisfaction of contraposition we must prove:
If S  p then for all s ∈ S it holds that S \ {s} ∪ {−p}  −s for any −p and −s.
By deﬁnition of , if S  p then S ′  p for some ﬁnite S ′ ⊆ S . Therefore we can without loss of generality assume that S is
ﬁnite. Next, if S  p then p ∈ Cn(S) by Lemma 39. Consider any −p. Then {p,−p} is AL-inconsistent by Deﬁnition 25(3c).
But then S ∪ {−p} is AL-inconsistent by Lemma 41. Then by simple rewriting for all s ∈ S it holds that (S \ {s})∪ {−p} ∪ {s}
is AL-inconsistent. By assumption that S is ﬁnite, Lemma 40 then yields that there exists an s′ ∈ Cn(S \ {s}∪ {−p}) such that
{s′, s} is AL-inconsistent. Then by Deﬁnition 25(3c) there exists an s′′ ∈ Cn({s′}) such that s′′ = −s. By Deﬁnition 23-(2) and
monotonicity, s′′ ∈ Cn(S \ {s} ∪ {−p}). Hence, −s ∈ Cn(S \ {s} ∪ {−p}). Hence, S \ {s} ∪ {−p}  −s by Lemma 39.
C-classicality is proven as follows. We ﬁrst prove that if S ⊆ L is AL-inconsistent, then some ﬁnite S ′ ⊆ S is AL-
inconsistent. By Deﬁnition 23-(4), ∃p ∈ L such that Cn(p) = L. Let p be denoted by ⊥. Now suppose S is inconsistent.
Then Cn(S) = L, so ⊥ ∈ Cn(S). By Deﬁnition 23-(3), ⊥ ∈ Cn(S ′) for some ﬁnite S ′ ⊆ S . But since Cn(Cn(S ′)) = Cn(S ′)
(Deﬁnition 23-(2)), this implies that Cn(S ′) =L.
Now assume S ⊆L is minimally c-inconsistent. Then for some p it holds that S  p,−p. By Lemma 39, {p,−p} ⊆ Cn(S).
By Deﬁnition 25(3b), {p,−p} is AL-inconsistent, and so by monotonicity Cn(S) is AL-inconsistent. But then by Deﬁni-
tion 23-(2), S is AL-inconsistent, and so some ﬁnite S ′ ⊆ S is AL-inconsistent. But since S is minimally inconsistent, it holds
that S ′ = S . Consider any s ∈ S . Then S \ {s} ∪ {s} is inconsistent. By adjunction and ﬁniteness of S there exists a formula
x ∈L that has exactly the same consequences as S \ {s}. Then by property (7) in Section 5.2 {x, s} is AL-inconsistent, and so
by Deﬁnition 25(3c) there exists a y ∈ Cn({x}) such that y = −s. But then S \ {s}  −s. 
Lemma 42. For any (AS,K) based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′), it holds that {p,q} is AL-inconsistent iff p  −q for some −q.
Proof. Suppose {p,q} is AL-inconsistent. By Deﬁnition 25(3) −q ∈ Cn{p} for some −q. By Lemma 39, p  −q. Suppose
p  −q for some −q. Then −q ∈ Cn({p}) by Lemma 39. By monotonicity −q ∈ Cn({p,q}). Furthermore, q ∈ Cn({p,q})
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Cn({q,−q}) =L. Then by Deﬁnition 23-(2) and monotonicity, Cn({p,q}) =L. 
Proposition 26. Let (AS,K) be based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′). Let 
1 be the c-SAF deﬁned by (AS,K) and ′ , and 
2 the AL-c-SAF
deﬁned by (AS,K) and ′ . Then, for T ∈ {complete, grounded, preferred, stable}, E is a T extension of 
1 iff E is a T extension of 
2 .
Proof. We ﬁrst show that:
X is acceptable w.r.t. E in 
1 iff X is acceptable w.r.t. E in 
2. (1)
1.1) Firstly, if Y undermines X , then p (= Conc(Y )) ∈ q, where q ∈ Prem(X). By Deﬁnition 25(3)-b, {p,q} is AL-inconsistent.
By Lemma 42, p  −q. Hence Y ASPIC+-AL-undermines X .
1.2) Secondly, if Y ASPIC+-AL-undermines X , then p (= Conc(Y ))  −q, where q ∈ Prem(X). Hence Y can be strictly
continued into an argument Y ′ that concludes −q, and so Y ′ undermines X .
Suppose Y defeats X in 
1 (Y ↪→
1 X ), and so ∃Z ∈ E , Z ↪→
1 Y . By 1.1), Y ↪→
2 X and Z ↪→
2 Y . Hence the left to right
half of 1) is shown.
Suppose Y ↪→
2 X , and so ∃Z ∈ E , Z ↪→
2 Y . By 1.2) there is a strict continuation Y ′ of Y s.t. Y ′ undermines X .
By condition 1-iii) of  being reasonable (Deﬁnition 18), it remains the case that Y ′ ⊀ X , and so Y ′ ↪→
1 X . By the same
reasoning, there is a strict continuation Z ′ of Z , s.t. Z ′ ⊀ Y and so Z ′ ↪→
1 Y . Since Z ′ undermines Y then Z ′ undermines Y ′ .
By condition 1-iii) of  being reasonable, Z ′ ⊀ Y ′ . Hence Z ′ ↪→
1 Y ′ . By Lemma 37, Z ′ is acceptable w.r.t. E , and by
Proposition 10, E ∪ {Z ′} is conﬂict free. Hence, since E is complete, Z ′ ∈ E . Hence the right to left half of 1) is shown.
Notice that (1) is shown in exactly the same way assuming the defeat deﬁnition of conﬂict free, except that in the ﬁnal
part of the above proof, we include the extra step of reasoning that since E ∪{Z ′} is conﬂict free under the attack deﬁnition,
it trivially follows that E ∪ {Z ′} is conﬂict free under the defeat deﬁnition (since the defeat relation is a subset of the attack
relation).
Given (1), the main proposition now follows from the following:
E is conﬂict free in 
1 iff E is conﬂict free in 
2. (2)
Proof of (2) under the attack deﬁnition of conﬂict free: Suppose E is conﬂict free in 
1, E is not conﬂict free in 
2. Then
∃Y , X ∈ E such that Y does not undermine X , Y ASPIC+-AL-undermines X . By 1.2, there is a strict continuation Y ′ of Y
s.t. Y ′ undermines X . Applying the same reasoning as for Z ′ above, Y ′ ∈ E , contradicting E is conﬂict free in 
1. Suppose
E is conﬂict free in 
2, E is not conﬂict free in 
1. Then ∃Y , X ∈ E such that Y does not ASPIC+-AL-undermines X , Y
undermines X , contradicting 1.1. Hence (2) is shown.
Proof of (2) under the defeat deﬁnition of conﬂict free: Suppose E is conﬂict free in 
1, E is not conﬂict free in 
2. Then
∃Y , X ∈ E such that Y does not defeat X in 
1, Y defeats X in 
2. Given the latter, Y ASPIC+-AL-undermines X on X ′ ,
Y ⊀ X ′ . But then there is a strict continuation Y ′ of Y s.t. Y ′ undermines X on X ′ , and by condition 1-iii) of  being
reasonable, Y ′ ⊀ X ′ , and so Y ′ defeats X on X ′ . Applying the same reasoning as for Z ′ above, Y ′ ∈ E , contradicting E is
conﬂict free in 
1.
Suppose E is conﬂict free in 
2, E is not conﬂict free in 
1. Then ∃Y , X ∈ E such that Y does not defeat X in 
2,
Y defeats X in 
1. Given the latter, Y undermines X on X ′ , Y ⊀ X ′ . But then we immediately have that Y ASPIC+-AL-
undermines X on X ′ and so Y defeats X in 
2. Contradiction. 
Proposition 27. Let (AS,K) be based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′). Then A is a c-consistent premise minimal argument on the basis of
(AS,K) iff (Prem(A),Conc(A)) is an abstract logic argument on the basis of (Σ,′).
Proof. Right to left: let (X, p) be an AL argument. Then X → p ∈ Rs , and so A is a strict ASPIC+ argument with
Prem(A) = X , Conc(A) = p. A must be premise minimal since otherwise there is a strict ASPIC+ argument A′ for p
with X ′ = Prem(A′), X ′ ⊂ X . But then by Lemma 39, p ∈ Cn(X ′), contradicting the minimality of (X, p). Suppose for con-
tradiction that A is not c-consistent. Then X  p,−p, and so by Lemma 39, {p,−p} ⊆ Cn(X). By Deﬁnition 25(3b), {p,−p}
is AL-inconsistent, and so Cn({p,−p}) =L. Then by Deﬁnition 23-(2) and monotonicity, Cn(X) =L, so X is AL-inconsistent.
Contradiction.
Left to right: let A be a c-consistent premise minimal ASPIC+ argument with Prem(A) = X , Conc(A) = p (i.e., X  p).
Then X ⊆ Σ and p ∈ Cn(X) (by Lemma 39), satisfying (1) and (3) of Deﬁnition 24. If p ∈ Cn(X ′) for some X ′ ⊂ X , then
X ′ → p ∈ Rs , and since X ′ ⊆ Kp , there is an A′ s.t. Prem(A′) = X ′ , Conc(A) = p, contradicting A is premise minimal.
Hence condition (4) of Deﬁnition 24 is satisﬁed. Suppose for contradiction that X is AL-inconsistent. By repeated application
of adjunction to the formulae in X \ {ϕ}, for some ϕ ∈ X , we have that Cn(X) = Cn({φ,ϕ}) = L′ . By Deﬁnition 25(3c),
∃φ′ ∈ Cn({φ}), s.t. φ′ ∈ ϕ , and so φ′ = −ϕ . By monotonicity, −ϕ ∈ Cn({φ,ϕ}). By Deﬁnition 23-(1), ϕ ∈ Cn({φ,ϕ}). Hence
ϕ,−ϕ ∈ Cn(X). By Lemma 39, X  ϕ , X  −ϕ; i.e., A is c-inconsistent. Contradiction. 
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that Prem(A) ⊆ Prem(A+) and Conc(A) = Conc(A+).
Lemma 43. Consider any AT for which  is deﬁned such that ∀A, B, A− , if A ⊀ B then A− ⊀ B.
1. If A defeats B then A− defeats B+ for all A− and B+ .
2. For all complete extensions E:
(a) if A ∈ E then A− ∈ E for all A−;
(b) if B /∈ E then B+ /∈ E for all B+ .
Proof. (1) If A defeats B based on a preference independent attack on a sub-argument B ′ of B , then A− preference inde-
pendent attacks and defeats B+ on B ′; else A preference dependent attacks and defeats B on B ′ , A ⊀ B ′ . Since A− ⊀ B ′ , A−
defeats B+ (on B ′).
(2a) Let A ∈ E and B defeat any A− . Then B also defeats A by 1. Then there exists a C that defeats B , so A− is acceptable
with respect to A, so (since E is complete) A− ∈ E .
(2b) Let B /∈ E . Then there exists an A that defeats B , and no C ∈ E s.t. C ↪→ A. But then A defeats B+ by 1, so B+ is not
acceptable with respect to E . 
Proposition 28. Let 
 be the (c)-SAF (A,C,) deﬁned on the basis of an AT for which is deﬁned such that for any A ∈A, if A ⊀ B
then A− ⊀ B.
Let 
− be the premise minimal (c)-SAF (A−,C−,−) where:
• A− is the set of premise minimal arguments inA.
• C− = {(X, Y )|(X, Y ) ∈ C, X, Y ∈A−}.
• −= {(X, Y )|(X, Y ) ∈, X, Y ∈A−}.
Then for T ∈ {complete, grounded, preferred, stable}, E is a T extension of 
 iff E ′ is a T extension of 
− , where E ′ ⊆ E and⋃
X∈E Conc(X) =
⋃
Y∈E ′ Conc(Y ).
Proof.
T = complete:
1) Suppose E is a complete extension of 
. We show that E− is a complete extension of 
− , where E− = E ∩A− .
Note ﬁrst that E− is (attack) conﬂict-free by construction.
(i) Let A ∈ E− and consider any B ∈ A− that defeats A. Since A ∈ E , there exists a C ∈ E that defeats B . But then (by
Lemma 43(1)) for all C− we also have that C− defeats B . Since all such C− ∈ E (by Lemma 43(2)), all such C− are in
E−, and so A is acceptable with respect to E−.
(ii) Let A ∈A− , A /∈ E−. Then A /∈ E , some B defeats A, ¬∃C ∈ E , C defeats B . There exists a B− that (by Lemma 43(1))
defeats A. Suppose for contradiction that A is acceptable w.r.t. E−. Then, ∃C ′ ∈ E− , C ′ defeats B− . By Lemma 43(1), C ′
defeats B . Since E− ⊆ E , C ′ ∈ E , contradicting ¬∃C ∈ E , C defeats B . So A is not acceptable with respect to E−.
Given (i) and (ii), E− is a complete extension of 
− .
2) Suppose E is a complete extension of 
− . We show that E+ is a T -extension of 
, where E+ = E ∪ {A+ ∈A | A ∈ E
and Prem(A+) ⊆ E}. Suppose E is a complete extension of 
− .
Note ﬁrst that E+ is conﬂict-free by construction.
(i) For any A ∈ E and any B ∈A that defeats A, we have that some B− ∈A− defeats A by Lemma 43(1), so some C ∈ E
defeats B− . But then C also defeats B by Lemma 43(1). Since C ∈ E+, we have that A is acceptable with respect to E+.
(ii) Consider any A+ ∈ E+, A+ /∈ E . Suppose B ∈ A defeats A+ . Then B defeats A+ on some A′ that is a premise in
Prem(A+). By deﬁnition of E+ and sub-argument closure of E , A′ ∈ E . By Lemma 43(1), B− ∈A− defeats A′ , and B−
is defeated by some C ∈ E . Since C defeats B (by Lemma 43(1)) and C ∈ E+, A+ is acceptable with respect to E+.
(iii) Consider ﬁnally any A ∈ A, A /∈ E+. Then no A− is in E , so for all A− there exists a B defeats A− , ¬∃C ∈ E , C
defeats B . By Lemma 43(1) B also defeats A. Suppose for contradiction that A is acceptable w.r.t. E+, and so ∃C ′ ∈ E+,
C ′ defeats B . Hence C ′ must be some C+ , where by Lemma 43-2 and construction of E+, C ∈ E+ and C ∈ E . By
Lemma 43(1), C defeats B , contradicting ¬∃C ∈ E , C defeats B .
By (i), (ii) and (iii), E+ is a complete extension of 
.
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1) Suppose E is a preferred extension of 
. Suppose for contradiction that E− is not a preferred extension of 
−. We
have shown that E− is a complete extension of 
−. Hence there must be some E ′ ⊃ E− that is a complete extension of

−. We have shown that E ′+ is a complete extension of 
. It is easy to see by construction of E− and E ′+ that E ⊂ E ′+,
contradicting E is a preferred extension of 
.
2) Suppose E is a preferred extension of 
−. Suppose for contradiction that E+ is not a preferred extension of 
. We
have shown that E+ is a complete extension of 
. Hence there must be some E ′ ⊃ E+ that is a complete extension of 
.
We have shown that E ′− is a complete extension of 
−. It is easy to see by construction of E ′− and E+, that E ⊂ E ′−,
contradicting E is a preferred extension of 
−.
T = grounded:
1) Suppose E is the grounded extension of 
. Suppose for contradiction that E− is not the grounded extension of 
−.
We have shown that E− is a complete extension of 
−. Hence there must be some E ′ ⊂ E− that is a complete extension
of 
−. We have shown that E ′+ is a complete extension of 
. It is easy to see by construction of E− and E ′+ that
E ′+ ⊂ E , contradicting E is the grounded extension of 
.
2) Suppose E is the grounded extension of 
−. Suppose for contradiction that E+ is not the grounded extension of 
.
We have shown that E+ is a complete extension of 
. Hence there must be some E ′ ⊂ E+ that is a complete extension of

. We have shown that E ′− is a complete extension of 
−. It is easy to see by construction of E ′− and E+, that E ′− ⊂ E ,
contradicting E is the grounded extension of 
−.
T = stable:
1) Let E be a stable (and so preferred) extension of 
. Then E− is a preferred extension of 
−. Suppose for contradiction
that E− is not a stable extension. Then ∃B ∈A−, B /∈ E−, and B is not defeated by an argument in E−. Note that B ∈A.
It cannot be that B ∈ E since the fact that B ∈A− would imply by construction of E− that B ∈ E−. Since E is stable, some
C ∈ E defeats B . By Lemma 43(1) all C− also defeat B , and by Lemma 43(2a) all such C− are in E . By construction of E−
all such C− are in E−, and so B is defeated by an argument in E−. Contradiction.
2) Let E be a stable (and so preferred) extension of 
−. Then E+ is a preferred extension of 
. Suppose for contradiction
that E+ is not a stable extension. Then ∃B ∈A, B /∈ E+, and B is not defeated by an argument in E+. Since E+ is preferred,
B is defeated by a C ∈A \ E+, where C is not defeated by an argument in E+.
C defeats B on some ϕ ∈ Prem(B). Note that ϕ ∈A−. If ϕ ∈ E then, since ϕ acceptable w.r.t. E , C is defeated by some
argument in E . But since E ⊆ E+ this contradicts that C is not defeated by an argument in E+. If ϕ /∈ E then, since E is a
stable extension of 
−, we have that ϕ is defeated by a D ∈ E , but then D also defeats B . Since D ∈ E+ this contradicts
that B is not defeated by an argument in E+.
Finally, we clearly have for any E and E− that Conc(E) = Conc(E−), and likewise for any E and E+. Then the propo-
sition follows from (1) and (2) for each of the above semantics. 
Corollary 29. Given 
 and 
− as deﬁned in Proposition 28:
1. ϕ is a T credulously (sceptically) justiﬁed conclusion of 
 iff ϕ is a T credulously (sceptically) justiﬁed conclusion of 
− .
2. 
− satisﬁes the postulates closure under strict rules, direct consistency, indirect consistency and sub-argument closure.
Proof. 1) and closure under strict rules, direct consistency, and indirect consistency immediately follow from Proposition 28.
For sub-argument closure expressed in Theorem 12, note that the proof of this theorem appeals to Lemma 35 which can
straightforwardly be seen to apply to 
− . The proof also depends on any sub-argument of A ∈ E not being in conﬂict with
any argument in E . This immediately follows for E− in the proof of Proposition 28, given that E− ⊆ E . 
Proposition 30. Let (A,C,) be deﬁned by an AL argumentation theory, where is deﬁned under the weakest or last link principles,
based on the set comparison Eli . Then ∀A, B ∈A, ∀A− ∈A, if A ⊀ B then A− ⊀ B.
Proof. Since all arguments are strict continuations of ordinary premises, the last and weakest link principles are evaluated
in the same way. Suppose A ⊀ B . Then Prem(A) Eli Prem(B). That is to say, it is not the case that ∃X ∈ Prem(A) s.t.
∀Y ∈ Prem(B), X  Y , i.e., ∀X ∈ Prem(A), ∃Y ∈ Prem(B) s.t. X  Y . Since Prem(A−) ⊆ Prem(A), it trivially follows that
∀X ∈ Prem(A−), ∃Y ∈ Prem(B) s.t. X  Y , i.e., A− ⊀ B . 
Proposition 32. Let 
 be the c-SAF based on (L′,Cn) and (Σ,′). Then for any complete extension E of 
: S = {φ|φ ∈ Prem(A),
A ∈ E} is AL-inconsistent iff S ′ = ClRs ({Conc(A)|A ∈ E}) is inconsistent.
Proof. Left to right: if S is AL inconsistent then ϕ,−ϕ ∈ Cn(S) for any ϕ . By deﬁnition of Rs , for some T , T ′ ⊆ S there exist
rules T → ϕ and T ′ → −ϕ in Rs . Since E is closed under sub-arguments and premises are sub-arguments, {Conc(A)|A ∈ E}
includes T and T ′ . Hence ϕ,−ϕ ∈ S ′ . That is, S ′ is inconsistent.
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S  ϕ and S  −ϕ . By Deﬁnition 25(3b), {ϕ,−ϕ} is AL-inconsistent, so Cn({ϕ,−ϕ}) = L. But since {ϕ,−ϕ} ⊆ Cn(S) and
Cn(Cn(S)) = Cn(S), we have by monotonicity of Cn that Cn(S) =L so S is AL-inconsistent. 
A.6. Proofs for Section 5.3
Theorem 34. Let (A,C,) be a c-SAF corresponding to a default theory Γ , and for any Σ ⊆ Γ , let Args(Σ) ⊆A be the set of all
arguments with premises taken from Σ . Then:
1) If Σ is a preferred subtheory of Γ , then Args(Σ) is a stable extension of (A,C,).
2) If E is a stable extension of (A,C,), then⋃A∈E Prem(A) is a preferred subtheory of Γ .
Proof of 1). Firstly, we show that Args(Σ) is conﬂict free. Since Σ is consistent, Σ c α,¬α for any α. Suppose for
contradiction that Args(Σ) is not conﬂict free, in which case ∃X, Y ∈ Args(Σ) s.t. Conc(X) = α, ¬α ∈ Prem(Y ). But
then since every such argument is obtained by applying the strict rules encoding all classical inferences to Σ , this implies
Σ c α,¬α. Contradiction.
We now show that for any Y ∈A \Args(Σ), ∃X ∈ Args(Σ) s.t. X defeats Y . Consider any such Y . Then ∃γ ∈ Prem(Y ),
γ /∈ Σ . By construction, Σ = Σ1 ∪· · ·∪Σn such that for i = 1 . . .n, Σ1 ∪· · ·∪Σi is a maximal consistent subset of Γ1, . . . ,Γi .
Hence, suppose γ ∈ Γ j for some j = 1 . . .n. Then Σ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Σ j ∪ {γ } c ⊥. Hence Σ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Σ j c ¬γ . Hence, ∃X ∈
Args(Σ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Σ j) s.t. Conc(X) = ¬γ , and so X ⇀ Y . Since γ ∈ Γ j , and all premises in X are in Γi , i  j (i.e., every
premise in X is greater or equal to γ ) then Prem(Y )Eli Prem(X), and so by the weakest or last link principle, X ⊀ Y .
Hence X ↪→ Y .
Proof of 2). Firstly, we show that
⋃
A∈E Prem(A) must be consistent. Suppose for contradiction that ∃X, Y ∈ E s.t.
Prem(X) ∪ Prem(Y ) c ⊥. Let {α1, . . . ,αm} be a minimal (under set inclusion) subset of Prem(X) ∪ Prem(Y ) s.t.
α1, . . . ,αm  ⊥. Hence, α1, . . . ,αm−1  ¬αm . Since E is stable and so complete, then by sub-argument closure (Theorem 12),
{A1, . . . , Am} ⊆ E , where for i = 1 . . .m, Prem(Ai) = {αi}. By Lemma 37, if {A1, . . . , Am} ⊆ E , where E is a complete exten-
sion, then any strict continuation of {A1, . . . , Am} is acceptable w.r.t. E , and so in E . Hence A ∈ E where A concludes ¬αm .
Hence, A ⇀ Am , contradicting E is conﬂict free.
Next, let E1, . . . , En be the partition of Form(E) s.t. for i = 1 . . .n, Ei is a (possibly) empty subset of Γi in the stratiﬁcation
Γ1, . . . ,Γn of Γ . Suppose for contradiction that Form(E) is not a preferred subtheory. Then, for some i, for k = 1 . . . i − 1,
E1, . . . , Ek is a maximal consistent subset of Γ1, . . . ,Γi−1, and ∃α ∈ Γi s.t. α /∈ Ei , and E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ei−1 ∪ Ei ∪ {α} ⊥. Hence,
∃Y ∈ A, Prem(Y ) = {α}, Y /∈ E . By assumption of E being a stable extension, ∃X ∈ E , X ↪→ Y . Since E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ei−1 ∪
Ei ∪ {α}  ⊥, then E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ei−1 ∪ Ei  ¬α, and so it must be that some β ∈ Prem(X) is in E j , j > i; i.e., β ∈ Prem(X),
Prem(Y ) = {α}, and β < α. Hence Prem(X)Eli1 Prem(Y ), Prem(Y )Eli1 Prem(X), and so X ≺ Y under the weakest or
last link principle, contradicting X ↪→ Y . 
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